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1. DEJA VU
They said it was inadvisable.
There was nothing to be gained from the radical publishing reform that
the new technology permitted. Allowing anyone with the appropriate hardware to publish scholarship would result in actually losing the value added to
works as they moved through the existing system of scholarly communication. Without experts supervising the production process in the usual way,
spelling and other errors would disfigure academic texts. Without the usual
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. B.A. (Juris.) Oxford
University, 1983; LL.B., Dalhousie University, 1984; LL.M., University of Toronto, 1985;
LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1988. E-Mail: <hibbitts@law.pitt.edu>; Web page: <http://
www.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/>. I am very grateful to my colleagues Peter Shane, Welsh White
and Harry Flechtner, and to Paul Ginsparg (physics), Ron LaPorte (public health), Andrew
Odlyzko (telecommunications) and David Rothman (Internet education), my interdisciplinary
co-laborers in the vineyard of electronic scholarly publishing, for their helpful comments on
a draft of this article. I would also like to thank my tireless research assistant, William
Curley, for his many intellectual and practical contributions to this piece. Responsibility for
the views contained herein, as well as for any errors or mistakes in interpretation is, of
course, mine alone. A hypertext and multimedia-enhanced version of Yesterday Once More
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reviewers pre-vetting scholarly output, basic quality control would be lost.
Readers would bend and eventually break under the weight of unprecedented
and unmanageable amounts of dubious information. Abandoning traditional
scholarly outlets would deprive authors of a critical means of gaining personal
prestige. Cutting neophytes out of the publication structure would deprive
them of a crucial educational experience. In any event, advocating reform was
a waste of time: entrenched academic elites would block any fundamental
alteration of the scholarly modus operandi,especially while the benefits of
progress could be secured - and most of its costs avoided - by simply turning the new technology over to established publishers.
Readers of the present collection of commentaries in this Special Issue
of the Akron Law Review will recognize these points. They are all criticisms
of the system of electronic self-publication that I proposed in my Web-posted
article Last Writes? Re-assessing the Law Review inthe Age of Cyberspace. '
But they are also recognizable from another context. Five hundred years ago,
every one of them was leveled at the scholarly proponents of commercial
printing.
The printing press and the remarkable publishing opportunities it offered
European scholars from the mid-fifteenth century onwards were not universally acclaimed. In some quarters, fear, shortsightedness and misapprehension
prompted outright attacks either on the new technology or on its more adventuresome applications. 2 More than a few academics believed there was nothing to be gained by handing scholarly publishing over to ordinary entrepreneurs like Johann Gutenberg; 3 they preferred to trust the strictly-learned
scribal system of scholarly communication that had kept important books in
circulation for centuries and that had lately spawned factory-like scriptoria
capable of limited mass production. 4 One late fifteenth century Dominican
is available on the World Wide Web at <http://www.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/akron.htm>.

1.Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Writes?: Re-assessing the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace,

(Version 1.0, Feb. 5, 1996), <http://www.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/last.htm> (currently archived
at http://www.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/arclw.htm). A re-designed and graphically-enhanced
edition of Last Writes? (Version 1.1, June 4, 1996) is now available via the original address
or directly at <http://www.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/lastrev.htm>. A slightly revised print version
of Last Writes? appears in 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 615 (1996).
2. "[Ilntellectuals were thrown into complete disarray by the arrival of a medium they did
not understand ....

" MARTIN LOWRY, THE WORLD OF ALDUS MANUTIUS: BUSINESS AND
SCHOLARSHIP IN RENAISSANCE VENICE 35 (1979).

3. Gutenberg himself started out as a goldsmith. In general "the printing industry [grew]
up too quickly for the regulations which normally controlled medieval crafts to grow with it.

Becoming a printer, wrote Erasmus acidly, was a great deal easier than becoming a baker.
This freedom of access probably does much to explain the bewildering variety of people who
were involved in printing ..... Id. at 8-9.
4. "[R]eaders with the necessary means could acquire sufficient manuscripts to satisfy their
needs..." RUDOLF HIRSCH, PRINTING, SELLING AND READING 1450-1550, at 14 (1967).
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friar, Filippo di Strata, actually said that "the world has got along perfectly
5
well for six thousand years without printing, and has no need to change now."
Fra Filippo and his sympathizers were concerned that scholars turning to
commercial printers would lose the benefits of scribes' editorial expertise, not
to mention their direct physical control over individual manuscripts: they
worried that printing would permit spelling mistakes, typographical errors and
other technical faults that might mar hundreds of copies of a single scholarly
work. Speaking of the threat to good spelling in a tract appropriately entitled
In Praise of Scribes, a German Abbot named Johannes Trithemius concluded
"[p]rinted books will never be the equivalent of handwritten codices ....The
6
simple reason is that copying by hand involves more diligence and industry."
The critics of commercial printing similarly believed that it threatened
to undermine the substantive quality of published scholarship by enabling
material that was not commissioned or pre-approved by the traditional (generally religious 7 or aristocratic) authorities to be widely marketed. Without
prior restraints, unscrupulous or unschooled printers were bound to unleash
a veritable flood of information, much of it inaccurate, and some of it dangerous. Fra Filippo accused the printers of "vulgarizing intellectual life." He
claimed that the Italian city-state of Venice had already become "so full of
books that it was hardly possible to walk down a street without having arm8
fuls of them thrust at you 'like cats in a bag' for two or three coppers." These
texts were "hopelessly inaccurate," having been prepared by "ignorant oafs;"
they tempted "uneducated fools to give themselves the airs of learned doctors." 9 In the absence of pre-certification, critics of commercial printing
moreover regarded that as a threat to their prestige. With less (or no) need of
sponsors and patrons to underwrite their work and afford them professional
and social status,'" how would they advance their careers or reputations?
Commercial printing additionally deprived the young monk or aspiring
Doctor of what Trithemius and others considered the "conspicuous" educational benefits of copying manuscripts: "his time, a most precious commodity, is productively put to use; his mind, while he writes, is illumined; his
5. Supra note 2, at 27.
6. JOHANNES TRITHEMIUS, IN PRAISE OF SCRIBES 65 (Klaus Arnold ed., 1974).
7. Trithemius wrote: "[i]f you ask which texts monks are to copy, the answer is simple:
whatever their superiors ask of them under obedience. It is for the abbot or prior to assign
tasks to the individual scribe." Id. at 73.
8. LOWRY, supra note 2, at 26.
9. Id.
10. "In relationships of patronage and dependence, the client would present manuscripts
upwards, either as a bid for reward or an expression of gratitude, and would dutifully copy
texts transmitted downwards, especially if they were composed or approved of by the patron."
HAROLD LOVE, SCRIBAL PUBLICATION IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY

ENGLAND

179 (1993).

AKRON LAW REVIEW - SPECIAL ISSUE

[Vol. 30:2

sentiments are enkindled to total surrender; and after this like he will be
crowned with a special reward .... And as he is copying the approved texts
he is gradually initiated into the divine mysteries and miraculously enlightened.""1 If printing were to be done, it were better done by experienced,
educated scribes in monasteries and established scriptoria. So long as they
remained in charge of publishing, scholars could take advantage of print's
production capacities without having to assume the risks inherent in operating outside the traditional editorial system.
Animated by these and other arguments, concerned professors and
churchmen tried to corral commercial printing on numerous occasions in the
1400s and 1500s. In an effort to impose old standards on the new technology,
they lobbied for laws requiring booksellers to obtain the permission of university and/or clerical review boards before printing any work whatsoever. In
1471, for example, an Italian classicist, Niccolo Perotti, asked the Pope to
impose pre-publication censorship to ensure that printed editions of classical
works were properly checked for errors. 2 In 1533, the Sorbonne went even
further, asking the French Crown to formally order the printing presses to shut
down.' 3 In the short run some of these initiatives succeeded, but as we now
know, they all failed in the long run. Meanwhile, many critics of commercial
printing continued to do academic business in the old, familiar way. They
wrote manuscripts and made copies, perpetuating a scribal tradition that survived on the margins of print culture until roughly the end of the seventeenth
century. "
In some superficial respects, of course, the critics of commercial printing were absolutely right. Many early printers did make spelling and other
technical errors, some of which were very serious. 5 The ability of print
authors to circumvent the traditional sponsorship system meant that inferior
material - especially religious propaganda and "pornography"' 6 (plus 9a
change...) - was produced in greater amounts and reached a wider audience
11. TRITHEMIUS, supra note 6, at 61.
12. James J. O'Donnell, The Pragmaticsof the New: Trithemius, McLuhan, Cassiodorus,
<http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/jod/sanmarino.html> at text accompanying n.21 (visited Aug. 30,
1996).
13. CURT F. BUHLER, THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY BOOK 45 (1960).
14. See generally Love, supra note 10; I.W. Saunders, The Stigma of Print: A Note on the
Social Bases of Tudor Poetry, I ESSAYS IN CRITICISM 139 (1951); Daniel Traister, Reluctant
Virgins: The Stigna of PrintRevisited, 26 COLBY Q. 75 (1990).
15. In 1476, for instance, the Italian scholar Franceso Filelfo wrote to Cardinal Marco
Barbo complaining that the Roman printer of his De Jesu Christi sacerdoti had corrupted it
so much that it was incomprehensible. William Caxton, the first English printer, openly
acknowledged his own technical limitations and humbly asked "theym that shal fynde faute
to correcte it & in so doyng they shal deserue thankynges & I shal praye god for them."
BUHLER, supra note 13, at 50-51 (quoting Caxton).
16. Much of this material was associated with printings of classical love-poetry, especially
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then it had previously. By making copying largely superfluous, printing disrupted ancient monastic and scholarly routines.
In more fundamental respects, however, the critics were wrong. First,
they were wrong in their underlying conviction that commercial printing
would compromise scholarship per se. Print's early editorial and qualitycontrol problems were soon overcome. Sometimes hiring scribes to assist
them, commercial printers developed proofreading and review systems that
internalized and in some ways improved upon the checking and control procedures associated with manuscript publication. 7 In conjunction with scholars, they developed and implemented indexing and cataloguing practices that,
despite the rush of printed information, made good learning more accessible
than ever. Second, the critics of commercial printing were wrong in thinking
that it would undermine scholarly prestige. Insofar as commercial printing
provided an independent means of securing a return on one's intellectual
labor, the financial support of prominent persons became less important, but
that did not prevent print-oriented scholars from continuing to solicit sponsorship and enjoy its monetary and status rewards." In the long run, commercial printing also made it possible to gain scholarly status in new ways, i.e.
through the standing of the publisher who chose to distribute a book, and/or
the extent of a book's success in the marketplace. Third, the critics were
wrong in their belief that commercial printing would compromise clerical
education. Monks and theological students who no longer did copywork soon
found - or were directed towards - other pedagogically - or spirituallyworthwhile activities. Far from suffering in the transition, many were doubtless glad of it.' 9 Fourth, the critics of commercial printing were wrong in
believing that established scribal institutions could control print publishing
just as they had controlled manuscript production. Some monasteries,
scriptoria,and individual scribes did experiment with print, but they had limited capital, time, manpower and incentive to develop the new technology. 0
the works of Ovid. In 1497, in an effort to stem the pornographic "tide", the Patriarch of
Venice ordered two printers to remove woodcuts of "naked women, phallic deities, and other
unclean objects" from the pages of a forthcoming edition of Metamorphoses. Such publications
were deemed to be especially objectionable as they might be seen by children. LOWRY, supra
note 2, at 27, 33.
17. BUHLER, supra note 13, at 47.
18. On the survival of literary patronage in seventeenth and eighteenth century England
see ALVIN

KERNAN, PRINTING TECHNOLOGY, LETTERS

& SAMUEL JOHNSON 29-35 (1987).

19. "Copying a complete codex by hand was physically demanding and could require months
of intensive labor by one or more scribes. Manuscripts occasionally allude to the copyist's
plight .... In at least one monastery of the Middle Ages penances were imposed on scribes
who were negligent in the performance of their duties: 130 genuflections to the monk who
disregarded the correct spelling, accentuation, and punctuation of the manuscript he was
copying, but only thirty for one who broke his pen in a fit of anger!" BARBARA A. SHAILOR,
THE MEDIEVAL BOOK 19 (1991).

20. See, e.g., HIRSCH, supra note 4. at 54; "[t]he establishment of a press was.., expensive.
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Many gave up, 2 1 or voluntarily assumed supporting roles in a commercialized
and secularized printing industry. Ultimately, the success of commercial
printing proved its critics so wrong that we can scarcely credit their arguments
today. Indeed, except for those arguments that were put into print (often by
others 22), their rhetorical legacy has largely disappeared.
Five centuries later, the actors have changed but the old roles remain.
Advocating - among other things - democratization and the speedy mass
distribution of learning, proponents of the electronic self-publication of legal
scholarship stand in the place of the commercial printers and their early academic supporters. Opposing them are a number of skeptical academics (including most of the commentators in this Special Issue 23) who by offering justifications for the traditional law review would unwittingly follow the exFew monasteries had the connections to market the products of a press successfully. It is
therefore easy to understand why their number was small and their output not significant
when contrasted with the entire production of the period." It has also been suggested that
"the mere act of setting up a press in a monastery or in affiliation with a religious order was asource of disturbance, bringing 'a multitude of worries about money and property' into a
realm previously reserved for meditation and good works." Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, From
Scriptoria to Printing Shops: Evolution and Revolution in the Early Book Trade, in BOOKS
AND SOCIETY IN HISTORY 29, 34-35 (Kenneth E. Carpenter ed., 1983). On the (low) proportion
of scribes who made the transition to print, see Sheila Edmunds, From Schoeffer to Verard:
Concerning the Scribes Who Became Printers, in PRINTING THE WRITTEN WORD: THE SOCIAL
HISTORY OF BOOKS, CIRCA 1450-1520 (Sandra L. Hindman ed., 1991) (noting, at 40, that
"the number of identifiable professional scribes who were once engaged in making manuscript
books and who subsequently went into printing would represent approximately 4 to 6 percent
of the probable total number of printers who worked before 1500.").
21. BUHLER, supra note 13, at 48.
22. A prominent exception to this "rule" was Abbot Trithemius himself, who (despite some
of his comments on printing in general) had In Praise of Scribes printed in order to spread its
ideas as far as possible. See NOEL L. BRANN, THE ABBOT TRITHEMIUS (1462-1516): THE
RENAISSANCE OF MONASTIC HUMANISM 148 (Heiko A. Oberman ed., 198 t).
23. Perhaps not surprisingly, the commentators cover a spectrum of positions, and are
therefore somewhat difficult to characterize as a wtiole. Howard Denemark and David Rier
appear to be categorically opposed to the idea of electronic self-publishing. Tom Bruce is
troubled by it. Henry Perritt sees it as an option that might precede, rather than replace
formal law review publication. Richard Delgado doubts its workability as a general
proposition, but thinks that "the idea of [occasionally] publishing one's work directly on the
Internet is a fine one." Richard Delgado, Eliminate the Middle Man?, 30 AKRON L. REV.
233, 233 (1996). William Ross believes that self-publishing would be appropriate only for
scholarship dealing with ephemeral subjects, or otherwise having limited readerships. Trotter
Hardy voices concerns, but describes himself as "sympathetic" and concludes his comment
by saying that "I confess that I think that web publication will become the publication of the
future, so my heart is with [Hibbitts]". Trotter Hardy, Review of Hibbitts's Last Writes, 30
AKRON L. REV. 249, 254 (1996). Gregory Maggs - notably the youngest of the legal
commentators, not to mention a former co-chair of the Harvard Law Review - feels that
while law reviews may yet have an ancillary contribution to make to the production of legal
scholarship, "self-publishing on the Internet will almost certainly become a reality." Gregory
Maggs, Self-Publication on the Internet and the Future of Law Reviews, 30 AKRON L. REV.
237, 237-38 (1996).
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ample of the late medieval scribes and scholars who either rejected new technology outright or - if they ostensibly accepted it - refused to recognize or
hesitated to endorse its capacity for structural reform. Concerns about the
appearance and substantive quality of printed scholarly texts that led some
fifteenth and sixteenth-century intellectuals to demand that commercial printers get academic permission before publishing now prompt their modern legal counterparts to call for the perpetuation and even enhancement of traditional editorial and peer review procedures on the Internet. Worries about the
future of scholarly prestige in a world without patronage now represent themselves in alarms at the prospect of legal academics losing the chance to place
their works with "elite" law reviews at Harvard, Yale and other "premiere"
law schools. Fears for the plight of monks and theological students deprived
of the educational opportunities inherent in copying manuscripts now reverberate in the arguments of law professors reciting the pedagogical "costs" to
law students of going without the vaunted law review experience. Assumptions about the ability of Renaissance church and state to resist religious,
political and social reforms fueled by the presses now revive in assertions that
conservative law school faculties and administrations will successfully stymie any Internet-facilitated deviations from the established channels of scholarly communication. Calls to confine printing to responsible monasteries and
scriptorianow find an echo in appeals for the organization of student- or faculty-edited electronic law journals to absorb the future scholarly output of
legal academics and (in the process) extend the power of modern legal publishers into a new medium.
The striking similarity between the present controversy over electronic
self-publishing and the long-settled battle over commercial printing suggests
primafacie that the arguments against my proposal in Last Writes? are overdrawn. The majority of commentators in this Special Issue are undoubtedly
disturbed by the prospect of sweeping, technologically-facilitated change (the
course of which never did run smooth). Like their fifteenth and sixteenthcentury forebearers, however, they have mistakenly presumed that the academic enterprise itself cannot prosper without the benefit of existing structures - in this instance, the law review. Having forgotten history, they may
have doomed themselves to repeat it.
II. THE RHETORIC OF REACTION
In 1991, Princeton social scientist Albert Hirschman wrote a well-received book entitled The Rhetoric of Reaction in which he sorted into separate rhetorical categories the principal arguments which were deployed to
counter such major post-Enlightenment reforms as the recognition of individual human rights, the universalization of the franchise, and the creation of
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the Welfare State. 24 My proposal for the electronic self-publication of legal
scholarship in the age of cyberspace obviously pales against the sweeping
significance of these changes, but in its own way and in its own sphere it is
nonetheless novel. At the same time, by his own admission, Hirschman's rhetorical genres "are not, of course, the exclusive property of 'reactionaries.'
They can be invoked by any group that opposes or criticizes new policy proIn this context, Hirschman's work offers a highly-suggestive
posals ....
structure within which to analyze - and, as appropriate, rebut - the specific26
counter-arguments advanced by the skeptics contributing to this collection.
"-2

Those counter-arguments can be distilled into five Hirschman-style
"Theses": first, the "Denial Thesis" (in this instance, denying that electronic
self-publication will secure significant scholarly benefits); second, what
Hirschman calls the "Perversity Thesis" (in this instance, holding that electronic self-publication will worsen the very conditions it purports to improve);
third, what Hirschman calls the "Jeopardy Thesis" (in this instance, the argument that by putting established publication procedures in jeopardy, electronic self-publication will incur costs); fourth, what Hirschman calls the
"Futility Thesis" (in this instance, holding that electronic self-publication is
an unachievable goal); and fifth, the "Alternatives Thesis" (in this instance,
asserting that most if not all of the purported benefits of electronic self-publication could be achieved by making other less drastic changes to the existing system of scholarly communication in law). In the remainder of this section I examine - and explode - each of these Theses in turn.
A. The Denial Thesis
In its present articulation, the Denial Thesis takes two forms. First, some
commentators skeptical of the electronic self-publishing proposal seem to
believe that there is nothingfundamentallywrong with the existing law review
system, and that there is thus no need or demand for change which could justify adopting my alternative: that it is, in David Rier's words, "a solution in
search of a problem. ' 27 In 1996, however, it is all but impossible to argue that
there is nothing rotten in the state of Denmark. 2 The output of literature as24. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY,
JEOPARDY (1991). Special thanks to Peter Shane for recommending this book to me.
25. Id. at 7.
26. It is not, however, the only such structure available. At a less specific level, the skeptics'
case against electronic self-publishing could also be examined in light of the now-classic
analysis of scientific resistance to "paradigm shifts." THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2nd ed., 1970).
27. David Rier, The Futureof Legal Scholarshipand Scholarly Communication:Publication
in the Age of Cyberspace, 30 AKRON L. REV. 183, 200 (1996).
28. Unless, of course, you're not Danish. In this context it's interesting that Rier, who of
all the contributors to the current collection is the one most opposed to electronic selfpublishing, and in some ways the one most comfortable with the existing law review system
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sailing law reviews in the last five years in particular has been nothing short
of prodigious, and the flood shows no signs of abating. 29 It has no parallel in
any other academic discipline. Many law professors who write for law reviews are unhappy because the reviews make arbitrary judgements, mangle
prose, delay publication and otherwise make it difficult for professors to get
their academic messages across in an accurate, effective and satisfying fashion. These grievances deserve to be taken seriously, especially as "law reviews are published primarily in order that they may be written."30 But law
review writers are not the only complainants. Many lawyers, judges and even
some law professors who use law reviews (even if they do not "read" them
cover to cover like one "reads" a magazine or newspaper) are unhappy because the leading legal journals are providing them with what they regard as
inappropriate content: in particular, an excess of theory at the expense of
doctrinal or practical information.3 In the context of such wide-ranging dissatisfaction on the part of both producers and consumers of legal literature,
there is obviously something deeply wrong with law's existing system of
scholarly communication.
The second and comparatively more credible version of the Denial Thesis holds that electronic self-publication would secure no meaningful benefits,
i.e. that regardless of any alleged "problem" with the existing publication
system, my proposal has nothing new and really desirable to offer legal scholars. For the most part, this is an argument from silence - a number of those
skeptical of electronic self-publication give virtually no consideration to what
such a system might have to offer them as writers or readers of scholarly work.
This facile dismissal of the potential advantages of change suits these skeptics rhetorically, especially when they go on to recite a litany of alleged costs32
to the proposal, thereby tipping their scales heavily against reform. If the costbenefit analysis they would undertake is not to be disingenuous, however, the
benefits of my proposal must be acknowledged and evaluated.
(even if he would reform it in certain respects - see infra notes 156-59 and accompanying
text), is a medical sociologist who does not have to publish in law reviews.
29. Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Writes?: Re-assessing the Law Review in the Age of
Cyberspace, (Version 1.1, June 4, 1996), <http:www.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/lastrev.htm>, paras.
2.15-2.27 [all particular references to "Last Writes?" in this article are to numbered paragraphs
in Version 1.1, rather than to locations in the unpaginated Version 1.0; as regards any material
quoted herein, the texts of Version 1.1 and Version 1.0 are identical]. Most recently, see
Symposium on Trends in Legal Citation and Scholarship, 7 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 748 (1996).
30. Harold C. Havighurst, Law Reviews and Legal Education. 51 Nw. L. REV. 22, 24

(1956).
31. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing
Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?; A Systematic Comparison of Law
Review Articles One Generation Apart, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1163 (1194).

32. See infra Section 11 C.
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The benefits accruing to legal scholars from electronic self-publication
derive both from self-publication per se and from Web publication as a general proposition. The benefits of self-publication rpertain primarily to authorial control. 33 Unburdened by arbitrary editorial constraints and prejudices,
34
legal scholars putting work directly online can write on virtually any subject
35
without considering what particular law reviews might or might not like. We
can write in whatever format we consider best suits our message, be that
analysis, story, dialogue or even poetry. For the first time in centuries, we can
publish in whatever layout we prefer, repainting the canvas of the traditional
"page" as we deem appropriate. 36 We can express our ideas using our own
styles and our own words, without having styles, words (and all too often,
errors) imposed upon us. We can edit and polish our work when we have the
opportunity to give those tasks the care they deserve, as opposed to when law
review editors meeting a production schedule demand that they be done. We
can disseminate our articles immediately upon completion, without waiting
for them to be reviewed and printed by others; we can even withhold them
until just the right moment to ensure their maximum impact and utility. In the
wake of online publication in particular, we can conveniently revise, update,
improve (and, if necessary, correct) our work without having to seek the assistance or approval of any middleman.3 7 Because we have self-published, we
can readily retain copyright in our own work, allowing us to authorize the reprinting or reproduction of our papers free from the frequently annoying and
33. "Self-publishing ... enabl[es] scholars to present and control their textual signs."
Jackie L. Hill MacLelland, A Rhetorical Process for Scholarly Self-Publishing 1 (1995)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Women's University) (on file with author).
34. Ironically (given the Internet's global scope), this may prove particularly valuable for
scholars writing articles about subjects of local interest: in normal circumstances these pieces
might have difficulty getting placed in law reviews seeking national readerships, and in some
instances, they might not find an academic home at all. On the general value of this kind of
work, see Howard Denemark, How Valid if the Often -Repeated Assertion That There Are Too
Many Legal Articles and Too Many Law Reviews?, 30 AKRON L. REV. 215 (1996).
35. The fact that under the present regime most legal articles - regardless of subject
will eventually find a home somewhere is cold comfort to authors who understand that all law
reviews are not created equal, and that failing to write on topics attractive to the major reviews
will almost certainly doom their work to remain unread and unrecognized.
36. "Arrangement in a self-published document in the information age demands that an
entire document be carefully considered, ordered, and designed. In the information age, the
total published piece must be perceived as not only the form in which a message is presented
but also the message itself. In self-published documents, encoders' rhetorical considerations
encompass the entire spectrum of writing and illustrating, as well as that of managing
technology, publishing, printing and information." MacLelland, supra note 33, at 73.
37. This capacity should not, however, be used as an excuse to post material online that is
still "raw" or unpolished. Unless there is an academically-legitimate reason for doing
otherwise, a writer owes his earliest online reader what we would currently term a "publishable"
piece (if he does not provide one, he should be publicly censured - see the discussion of
quality control via reader comments, infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text).
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counter-productive restrictions which have traditionally been imposed by
journals and presses publishing for us. 3" Such radical author empowerment
promises to enhance the quality and creativity of legal scholarship, not to
39
mention the job-satisfaction of legal scholars.

The benefits of the Web as a specific self-publishing platform are by
definition somewhat more technical, but they too are extremely significant.
On the Web, legal scholars can construct documents in hypertext, making
direct, potentially non-linear connections between sources and ideas which
are difficult if not impossible to make using print citations.4" On the Web, we
don't have to pay or depend upon publishers for reprints of our own work: we
can provide all our readers with electronic documents that each one of them
can view, save, print and even annotate4' for later use.4 2 On the Web, we can
38. Unlike publishers who wish to give only paying customers access to their published
information, scholars (for the most part) want to have their ideas disseminated to as broad an
audience as possible. See Stevan Harnad, Implementing Peer Review on the Net: Scientific
Quality Control in Scholarly Electronic Journals, in SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING: THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 105 (Robin P. Peek and Gregory B. Newby eds., 1996) [hereinafter
SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING] ("The scholar/scientist ... wants to reach his peers' eyeballs so as
to influence the contents of their minds; his interest is not in the contents of their
pocketbooks.").
39. As regards the last of these, the benefits of electronic self-publishing obviously go far
beyond saving legal scholars "the humiliation of the occasional rejection." Delgado, supra
note 23, at 235.
40. While accepting that hypertext will avoid certain citational complexities, Trotter Hardy
suggests that citation (and perhaps even the Bluebook itself) will survive in a Web-based
publishing environment. Hardy, supra note 23, at 253-54. Im not so sure. In a few
circumstances Web authors might wish to make explicit reference to the source of a hypertext
link in the text of one's own document, but in most instances I imagine that citation would be
(and, to enhance document legibility, perhaps should be) implicit or embedded. For instance,
instead of writing and highlighting "Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: Cyberspatial
Settings and the FirstAmendment, 104 YALE L.J. 1681 (1995)" or some such technical formula
designating a recent article by Ethan Katsh, authors would highlight a word or words in their
text (perhaps quoting Katsh) which would then lead the interested reader directly to the
relevant paragraph of Katsh's article. In this context readers would still be able to tell where
they were going before they went, but that information would be yielded in some standard
form by their browsers (today, for instance, Netscape would report the URL for Katsh's
article if I passed my mouse over a hypertext link to it).
41. Thanks to the capacities of the Web, one might even envisage an interested reader reposting an annotated article online as a highly particular form of publicly accessible reader
comment. Some listserv e-mail postings already display this structure as writers quote and
then systematically reply to specific points in a previous message. Far from being a rhetorical
novelty, this type of document would in fact be the twenty-first century equivalent of the
published "commentaries" (e.g., Coke on Littleton) that performed similar ancillary functions
in law and other scholarly fields in the medieval and early modern periods. Might its
development herald "the [re]birth of the reader"? See Laurence J. Victor, Travel Guide to
Cyberspace 2020: Simulated Instructions, 6 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 435, 457-58 (1995)
("Readers will attach comments and create links. Paths of readers will weave tours for others
to follow. Champion readers will become as authors.").
42. The ability of readers to retain and manipulate copies of web-posted documents has led
a few legal scholars (albeit none contributing to this collection) to suggest that Web-based
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write and present in color, enriching and enlivening our articles while developing new ways of organizing our messages. 43 On the Web, we can use
multimedia to full effect, deploying graphics, audio and video not only to
make our scholarship more striking, more memorable44 and even more accessible,45 but to open up for investigation visual and aural aspects of legal process which have largely been invisible (or inaudible) to print. On the Web,
we can expedite the distribution of our work by sidestepping the delays of mail
distribution. On the Web, we can reach an international and interdisciplinary
audience, profoundly expanding the range of our scholarly influence. Finally,
thanks to the Web's capacity to carry e-mail, we can conveniently elicit and
receive reader reactions to our work that we may answer,! attach as a source
of information for future readers, and/or use as a basis for revision and improvement.4 6 As scholar speaks electronically unto scholar, we have the
opportunity to develop the dialogue and debate47 that, although rarely realized
self-publishing might prove to be a bonanza for plagiarists and pirates. However sincere
these concerns, they overlook the critical fact that the Web also makes detection of unauthorized
uses easier than ever: "Just type into one of the many search services a couple of sentences of
a [paper], and you will be able to discover any pirated [or plagiarized] version of the piece."
The Property of the Mind, THE ECONOMIST, July 27, 1996, at 57, 59. It might also be mentioned
that electronically self-published articles are no more vulnerable to plagiarizing and pirating
than articles posted to the Web by established journals.
43. "One of the most effective of all the visual elements, color is expensive to produce on
the written page .... [But color] affects people physically. Red raises blood pressure, increases
appetite and raises body temperature. Pink can have a calming effect, as can green .... Color
also ... can serve to connect related ideas within a text (and across multi-volume works) in
" MacLelland, supra note 33, at 121.
some discourses ..
44. Numerous studies have suggested that multimedia presentation dramatically enhances
recall. One recent survey suggested that although people retain only 10% of what they read,
they retain 20% of what they hear, and 30% of the images they see. Using text, speech and
images together is even more mnemonically effective. Victor Dwyer, Surfing Back to School,
MACLEAN'S Aug. 26, 1996, at 42.
45. "Because it places more emphasis on sounds and images, multimedia publications offer
And younger [readers], raised on television
dyslexic readers another avenue for learning ....
and MTV, are more adept at acquiring information visually and aurally than their parents.
For coming generations, multimedia is a natural." Rob French, Where is PublishingHeaded?,
ADOBE MAG. May/June, 1996, at 34, 37. Even more fundamentally, multimedia presentation
might make formal scholarship (and legal scholarship in particular) more attractive, more
engaging and more fulfilling for members of gender, racial and ethnic groups which because
of prejudice, historically-limited educational opportunities and comparatively-low literacy
levels have been marginalized in the dominant print (i.e. text-based) culture of the academy.
See generally Bernard J. Hibbitts, The Interface is the Message, WIRED, Sept. 1996, at 130.
46. "Instead of being dead-on-arrival, every article we write on the Web can be a living
creature, capable of interactivity, growth and evolution." Hibbitts, supra note 29, at para. 4.6.
See also Abdul Paliwala, From Academic Tombstones to Living Bazaars: The Changing Shape
of Law Reviews, 1 J. INFO., L. AND TECH. (Jan. 31, 1996), <http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/elj/jilt/
issue I/l abdul/>.
47. Might this "dialogue and debate" degenerate into the chaos of some electronic bulletin
boards and listservs? Evidence from established groups seems to suggest that if the topic of
debate is limited to, say, the virtues of a specific scholarly article (as opposed to the contents
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in recent practice, has historically and theoretically been regarded as the test
and foundation of sound scholarship.4"
The many benefits of electronic self-publication are not hypothetical;
they are actual. They are being enjoyed today not only by individual scholars in law, but by entire disciplines - most notably physics, which since 1991
has relied on an archive of self-published "pre-prints" run by Paul Ginsparg
at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.49 Thousands of physicists worldwide have already contributed to this resource; tens of thousands
use it every day. The Los Alamos archive has in practice superseded the traditional physics journals as the primary locus of scholarly communication in
the physics field. If electronic self-publishing had no benefits as a scholarly
strategy, this simply would not have happened.
To the (limited) extent that adherents of the Denial Thesis do evaluate
what I consider to be the benefits of electronic self-publication, they tend to
argue that those benefits are in truth neither positive nor significant. Most
notably, David Rier asserts that the ability of self-published scholars to instantly disseminate their completed research over the Web would do little for
them or for their readers. Unfortunately, Rier fails to appreciate the implications of instant - or, for that matter, delayed - dissemination. Take the
present law review system. The lag between acceptance of an law review
article and its formal publication is all-too-often a year or more. Given how
fast law changes these days,5" such a lag can prove academically fatal: a new
statute or a new precedent can render an analysis obsolete or inapplicable very
shortly after (or even before) it appears. Less obviously, even the standard
of an entire field or sub-field, with no pre-set agenda), discussion is much more likely to be

responsible, on point, and (ultimately) useful. See generally Andrew Odlyzko, Untitled,
<http://www.mathematik.uni-trier.de:8080/literatu/odlyzko2.html> visited September 9, 1996,;
Andrew Odlyzko, Tragic Loss or Good Riddance? The Impending Demise of Traditional
Scholarly Journals, 42 INT'L J. HUM.-COMPUTER STUD. 71, 91-93 (1995).
48. "This [dialogue] could continue indefinitely, even a hundred years after the initial
A research paper would be a living document, evolving as new comments
submission ....
and revisions were added. This process by itself would go a long way toward providing
trustworthy results." Andrew Odlyzko, Tragic Loss or Good Riddance? The Impending Demise
of Scholarly Journals, in SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING, supra note 38, at 91, 97.
49. See generally Paul Ginsparg, First Steps Toward Electronic Research Communication,

<http://xxx.lanl.gov/ftp/hep-th/papers/macros/blurb.tex> (visited Sept. 9, 1996).
50. As Trotter Hardy reminds us in this very collection, "We are no longer a legal community
of common law courts, gradually evolving, in piecemeal fashion, over the course of decades.
We are a world of statutes and regulations, coming out with startling speed." Hardy, supra
note 23, at 252. See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment: Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 635, 644 (1989) ("By most accounts, the pace of legal change (legislative and judicial)
has never been greater."). In the age of cyberspace, law is likely to change even faster. See
also Robert A. Stein, The Future of Legal Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 945, 963 (1991)
("[N]etworks of scholars and practitioners working in common speciality areas and joined by
computers will immediately share knowledge about the use and success of novel legal theories
and procedures, vastly increasing the pace of change in the law.").
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months-long lag between acceptance and publication all but ensures that by
the time other law professors comment on a published piece (by letter or email), the original author has already completed a follow-up piece or has
moved on to another subject. In these circumstances most of the benefit of the
commentary is lost before it is offered - which helps to explain why so few
law professors offer post-publication commentary on others' papers. The
problem is only compounded if a law professor responds to another in print.
In this situation, it is often two years or more (from original submission)
before the original author or the observing legal academy gains enlightenment
from the "exchange," presuming they are even aware of it having occurred. 5
These realities inevitably discourage the dialogue and debate which I've al52
ready identified as so important to the scholarly enterprise.
In an electronic self-publication system, however, the pace of scholarly
communication is considerably accelerated.5 3 "Instant dissemination" of legal
scholarship permits publication on the heels of completion, and therefore
greatly increases the likelihood that an article will appear in time to matter.
Instant dissemination of legal scholarship also has the potential of provoking
instant reader responses which can reach a legal author directly, can reach her
while her mind is still on her subject, and can reach her while she can still react
and/or make revisions in light of comments received. 54 The fact that comments can have a considerable impact in these altered circumstances will only
encourage more of them to be made, which will give scholars more impetus
55
to rethink and revise, which will in turn provoke more comments, etc., etc.
51. Given the shortcomings of contemporary indexing, an article printed in one journal
responding to an article that initially appeared in another may not be found by the author of
the first piece or other interested readers until long after the response is printed.
52. Publishing delays have the same consequences in science. See David Green, Death of
an Experiment, INT'L SCI. AND TECH., May 1967, at 83 ("No one argues a point in a journal if
it takes a year from the time of submission of a manuscript to the time of publication.")
53. See generally id. at 84 ("Anything which leads to or accelerates the solution of problems
is in the best scientific interest.").
54. In this context, psychologist Stevan Harnad has suggested that the pace of scholarly
exchange over the Internet will approach the "speed of thought": "Whatever ideas could have
been generated by minds interacting at biological tempo are forever lost at paper-production
tempos. Scholarly skywriting [Harnad's term for the electronic dialogue I discuss in the text]
promises life for more of these potential brain children, those ideas born of scholarly intercourse

at skyborne speeds, progeny that would be doomed to stillbirth at the earthbound speeds of
paper communication." Harnad, supra note 38, at 114. In the physics preprint archive,
"everyone mentions how beneficial it has been to get constructive criticisms from the most
E-mail from Paul Ginsparg to Bernard
interested readers within days (or hours) .......
Hibbitts (Sept. 30, 1996).
55. "[T]exts produced through on-line conferences reflect a more authentic scholarly
dialogue: distinctions between authors and readers become blurred as participants function in

both roles, their voices represented as distinct even as their particular contributions get woven
into synthetic and emergent products." Teresa M. Harrison & Timothy Stephen, Computer
Networking, Communication and Scholarship, in COMPUTER NETWORKING AND SCHOLARLY

YESTERDAY ONCE MORE

Winter 1996]

By permitting immediate reaction, instant dissemination of legal scholarship
also makes it more likely that third party readers will have the benefit of seeing an article critically discussed and evaluated while it is still relevant and
still familiar.
This Special Issue of the Akron Law Review ironically proves my points
on reader response. Because Last Writes? was a self-published article instantly disseminated over the World Wide Web, it became available for comment much sooner than if it had gone through the standard law review system.
The fact that I received electronic and written comments - including Rier's
- within hours, days, and weeks of my actual completion of the paper (at least
in its initial version), instead of a year or so down the line after one or more
rounds of formal print-based publication, has allowed me to derive much more
practical benefit from them. By cutting in half the normal "lag time" between
print publication and print response, the instant online dissemination of Last
Writes? has also helped to ensure that the readers of this collection will see
those comments when it will do them the most good, i.e. while the article
prompting them is still very topical.
B. The Perversity Thesis
Taken to extremes, the Denial Thesis - asserting no benefit from electronic self-publishing - transmutes into Hirschman's Perversity Thesis: in
this instance, that electronic self-publishing will actually make the scholarly
situation worse instead of better.16 In effect, this is one of the arguments of
Trotter Hardy,5 7 who alleges that Web self-publication might draw law professors into the technical quagmire of hypertext and multimedia, slowing
down rather than speeding up the pace of scholarly exchange. Scholars creating high-tech enhancements would also incur an intellectual opportunity
cost insofar as their time would not have been "devoted to substantive legal

thinking. "58
Like other historical articulations of the Perversity Thesis which have
granted the transformative potential of reform but have purported to reveal
that as a danger, Hardy's argument seems neat in theory, but in practice it is
COMMUNICATION

IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY UNIVERSITY 3, 17 (Teresa
COMPUTER NETWORKING).

M. Harrison

and Timothy Stephen eds., 1996) (hereinafter

56. See generally HIRSCHMAN, supra note 24, at 11-42.
57. Henry Perritt also advances a form of the Perversity Thesis in claiming that
"implementation of Professor Hibbitts' proposal is likely to make the quality of the Web
worse, and to exacerbate the most important of the problems prompting criticisms of studentedited law reviews - poor quality." Henry Perritt, Reassessing ProfessorHibbitts' Requiem
for Law Reviews, 30 AKRON L. REV. 255, 255 (1996). In this article, however, I will consider
the quality control point under the rubric of the Jeopardy Thesis (i.e. as a specific "cost" to be
incurred), which is how the majority of the skeptics approach it.
58. Hardy, supra note 23, at 250.
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exaggerated. Incorporating hypertext, video and audio components into Web
documents is - as a matter of technology - already very simple, and is getting easier all the time. I know; I've been working with hypertext and multimedia for months. As I write this, a microphone and an inexpensive video
camera sit on my computer console. It would take me less than five seconds
to program a hypertext link in HTML (and that's in raw code, without an
HTML "editor"), less than two minutes to record an short audio segment and
code that into a given Web document, and probably less than three minutes to
record and incorporate a brief video segment. If a picture (or a sound, or a
hyperlink to a picture, a sound or even another text) is "worth a thousand
words" that's not a bad investment of time. Even leaving aside the cliche,
programming a hyperlink and recording particular audio or video segments
may take less time than it already takes most of us to craft a good paragraph,
or sometimes even a good sentence. In this context, it's virtually impossible
to credit the contention that using these technological options will take so
much time and energy that they would seriously slow the pace of scholarly
production and exchange. On the contrary, Web-based multimedia might
ultimately speed that process up (and otherwise enhance it) by allowing legal
academics to substitute immediate depiction for lengthy second-hand description. Of course, none of this is to say that academic authors (or anyone else,
for that matter) should employ multimedia in Web documents simply "because they're there." Rather, the fact that multimedia are quick and easy gives
electronic self-publishers the freedom to use them appropriately. Instead of
having to leave them out solely because incorporating them would take too
long, we can include them whenever we conclude that they would make a
document or a point more comprehensible and more memorable.
But what about hypertext and multimedia as conceptual constructs?
Now here's the rub. Trotter Hardy suggests that hypertext and multimedia
require "new ways of thinking" and implies that adjusting to them will take
time and effort that might otherwise be invested in the intellectual content of
legal scholarship. Making the transition to hypertext and multimedia will
certainly take a while59 and might not be easy for everyone (indeed, for some,
59. The time involved will depend on what is meant by "transition." Using hypertext and
multimedia as technical tools in traditionally-styled articles (e.g., Last Writes?) is but the
first step in the process. Re-organizing scholarly "writing" in a way which overtly favors
hypertext and multimedia is the second step. Re-conceiving the nature of law in light of what
hypertext and multimedia facilitate and reveal is the third step. So far, only a very few legal
scholars have taken the first step, none (to my knowledge) have as yet taken the second, and
only a handful are even contemplating the third. For suggestive but still very preliminary
"third-step" analyses. see Ronald K. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 509 (1992); Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Motions: The Embodiment of Law in Gesture, 6
LEGAL ISSUES 51 (1995); ETHAN M. KATSH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF LAW (1989); ETHAN M. KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD (1995).
J. CONTEM.
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it might prove to be impossible), but I doubt that it will have the necessarilycompromising effect on scholarship that Hardy seems to fear. Consider a
situation that he himself describes: "many [legal] authors do not do a wonder60
ful job of organizing their material in linear, old-fashioned text as it is."
Hardy seems to feel that these authors are simply lacking in ability, 6' but what
if they are merely running up against organizational or cognitive obstacles
imposed by the currently-dominant scholarly medium, i.e. text? Perhaps these
scholars would do better communicating with the aid of hypertext and
multimedia62 - far from slowing them down intellectually, using such nonlinear forms might speed them up, and improve the quality of their scholarly
products into the bargain. Many scholars who are relatively more comfortable
with linearity may not find hypertext and multimedia quite so liberating, but
they may nonetheless discover that those tools give them rhetorical options
which more than compensate for the effort put into mastering them. On a more
general level, I'm not sure that we should draw a sharp "zero-sum" distinction between using media and thinking about law. The one process arguably
informs and opens up new horizons onto the other. Writing, for instance, has
influenced the agenda and attitude of Western jurisprudence for hundreds of
years. 63 Deploying hypertext and multimedia will likely have similarly-significant consequences for substantive legal thought; far from imposing an
opportunity cost on over-enthusiastic legal scholars, such deployment might
and law-making that might never have
inspire insights into dimensions of 6law
4
been prompted by direct analysis.
C. The Jeopardy Thesis

Most of the counter-arguments advanced in this collection against my
proposal for electronic self-publication are instances of what Hirschman calls
the "Jeopardy Thesis: ' 65 they assert that adopting my proposal would jeopardize legal scholarship, legal scholars and law students by eliminating academic and pedagogical benefits bestowed by the current law review structure.
In other words, electronic self-publishing would incur costs, and that makes
it unacceptable.
The very premise of the Jeopardy Thesis is dubious. The existence of
costs per se does not provide enough reason to reject any given reform proposal. By definition, all reforms - as changes - come with costs of some
60. Hardy, supra note 23, at 250.
61. "One shudders to think what these authors would make of the multi-dimensional
organizational schemes facilitated - indeed required - by hypertext!" Id.
62. See supra note 45.
63. See generally KATSH, supra note 59.
64. Id.
65. See generally HIRSCHMAN, supra note 24, at 81-132.
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sort (a point which, by the way, reveals the Jeopardy Thesis to be extremely
reactionary, so much so as to be pre-emptively against any change). To take
an historical example, commercial printing incurred costs. We have already
seen that in the short term, printers made editorial and technical errors and had
problems with quality control; in the long term, printing deprived many copyists of their occupations, if not their livelihoods. Additionally, print made
scholars technologically dependent on the members of a trade.66 Its mechanical limitations disfavored images, color and fine handwriting.67 Its finality
rendered textual corrections difficult and expensive to make. Printing nonetheless triumphed over manuscript production because its advantages speed, mass production, standardization, general low cost - outweighed
those liabilities. The same logic applies to my proposal for the electronic selfpublication of Web scholarship. It would doubtless incur certain costs (most
obviously, taking the time to learn the relevant - if simple - computer
skills), but it should nonetheless be adopted as a scholarly strategy because
those losses are outweighed by the considerable benefits it would bring.6"
This favorable balancing of accounts is all the more probable insofar as
the adherents of the Jeopardy Thesis have radically over-estimated the costs
that electronic self-publishing would entail. Like Chicken Little, these anxious scholars would have us believe that the sky is falling. First, they assert
that electronic self-publishing would necessarily incur a loss of the "value
added" to individual scholarly articles as they move through the current law
review production system. Second, they insist that electronic self-publishing
would inevitably lead to a loss of quality control over legal literature as a
whole, resulting in a proliferation of poor scholarship. Third, they say that
electronic self-publishing would entail a loss of prestige for authors who
would no longer be able to claim the glory of good placements in reputable
legal journals. Fourth, they argue that electronic self-publishing would deprive law students of the critical educational opportunities currently afforded
them by their editing of current law reviews. Fifth and finally, they contend
that electronic self-publishing would rob the same students of a credential
they need to get good professional and academic jobs after graduation. As we
shall see, none of these claims is justified.
1. Value Added
Consider the "value added" argument. As articulated primarily by
66. In the late fifteenth century, Abbot Trithemius astutely reminded his readers that the
manuscript copyist "does not suffer constraint under contract with a printer, but is free, and
by his office will take pleasure in the sweetness of his liberty." See BRANN, supra note 22, at
157.
67. "[P]rinting generally neglects orthography and various other types of embellishments
characterizing [manuscript] books." Id. at 158 (quoting Trithemius).
68. See supra Section II A.
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Richard Delgado, Henry Perritt and Tom Bruce, it holds that without formal
law review publication, legal articles would be deprived of the value added to
them when law review staffers edit their texts, verify their sources, standardize their forms, register their release (establishing "intellectual priority"),
distribute and publicize them, associate them with other good or related articles in "issues," preserve them for posterity and/or make them eventually
citable and locatable. This case against publishing one's own legal scholarship online sounds overwhelming, but it has two rather fundamental weaknesses.
To begin, it implicitly overstates the quality of the various values added
to articles by the current law review system. For example, law review redaction of legal scholars' submitted drafts is problematic. Because authors'
mistakes slip by unnoticed and because mistakes are often introduced into a
manuscript by law review editors themselves, spelling and style errors fre69
quently show up in printed articles. Richard Delgado correctly points out
7
(now
that in Version 1.0 of Last Writes? I misspelled "accommodate"
amended in Version 1.1), but a WESTLAW search indicates that in the past
fourteen years, for one reason or another, well-established law reviews have
done likewise 947 times 7' (and those misspellings notably remain uncorrected7 2). Self-publishers also have no monopoly on stylisticly-awkward
sentences: Richard chides me for one rather "Germanic" structure (also since
amended), but he fails to acknowledge that law reviews themselves "have be73
Law
come nursing homes for hobbled sentences and confused syntax."
review copy-editing has in fact become so bad that it has lately led to litigation: in 1994, a student at the Fordham Law School sued the student-edited
74
Fordham InternationalLaw Journalfor mangling his Note. Although the
suit was dismissed on summary judgment for failing to disclose a cause of
action in federal law, the Journal nonetheless acknowledged its editorial
errors and proposed to print an erratasheet. Verification of sources by law
69. Incorrectly, he also claims that I misspelled "subtly" as "subtlely."

Webster's Third

New International Dictionary indicates that the latter spelling is an acceptable variant.
70. Specific errors in the prototype Web version of Last Writes? should not be necessarily
associated with electronic self-publishing as a genre, which can be organized to avoid them.
See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
71. Search of WESTLAW, TP-ALL file (Apr. 5, 1996). When I obtained this result I
initially suspected that the high figure was the product of inputting errors at West, but in
every instance when I checked the database against the print original, the error was there as
indicated.
72. See, e.g., 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1479, 1533, n.54 (1994); 83 GEO. L.J. 525, 553 (1994); 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1482 (1995); 71 IND. L. J. 673, 726 (1996); 46 STAN. L. REV. 1487,
1539 (1994); 80 VA. L. REV. 403, 449 (1994); 92 MICH. L. REV. 1953. 1957 (1994). Article
titles and authors have been omitted to protect the unfortunate.
73. Rosa Ehrenreich, Look Who's Editing, LINGUA FRANCA, Jan./Feb., 1996, at 58, 60.

74. Choe v. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, 920 F.Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

AKRON LAW REVIEW - SPECIAL ISSUE

[Vol. 30:2

review staff members is sometimes no better than law review redaction. As
William Ross notes elsewhere in this collection, "all too many law reviews
perform citation checks neglectfully, negligently, or incompetently."7 5 In any
event, American legal scholars should not fetishize editorial verification when
many scholarly journals in the arts, humanities and sciences (not to mention
book publishers7 6 and legal journals in most other countries) cope very well
without it, relying on the good faith and reliability of scholarly authors. Even
the law review's role in standardizing legal scholarship is conceptually and
practically problematic. Standardizing a text has traditionally required freezing it, thereby ensuring (short of a later reprinting in a book) that it cannot
reflect new developments or new sources. In more than a few instances, standardization has had the undesirable side-effect of propagating and preserving
the editorial errors I mentioned earlier.
Other "values" supposedly added by current editorial and publishing
procedures have similarly been overstated. Having articles published in law
reviews is a common way of registering them for credit and recognition within
the legal academy, but the registration process is very inexact: not only are
articles often printed months after their "official" publication dates, but as far
as establishing intellectual priority goes, it's virtually impossible to tell
whether one article in a "Fall 1995" issue of one journal actually predated (or
post-dated) another on the same subject in the "Fall 1995" issue of a second.
Law reviews' distribution and publicization of articles is likewise problematic. True, publishing an article in the HarvardLaw Review or the Yale Law

Journalmay bring it to the attention of readers both inside and even outside
the legal community, but most other legal journals are neither actively marketed nor generally distributed on law school routing lists. Their contents (i.e.
99% of the legal articles produced) are therefore never adequately distributed
or otherwise "publicized": in the face of this depressing fact, most legal scholars are compelled to "self-distribute" and "self-publicize" by sending reprints
directly to desired readers.77 Physical association of an individual's work with
other good or relevant articles in single issues of a specialty journal or even
regular volumes of a general journal theoretically locates her in a broad community of scholars,78 but given the subdivision of the academic audience and
75. William Ross, Scholarly Legal Monographs: Advantages of the Road Not Taken, 30

L. REV. 259, 264 (1996).
76. Id. at 263-65.
77. Given that law reviews usually provide authors with only 50 free reprints, this "self-
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distribution"/"self-publicization" practice can get rather expensive. In this context legal
scholars are not only doing without a "value" allegedly added by law review publication, but
they are literally paying for its absence.
78. "Journals help to 'create [a] ...sense of unity among scholars by connecting people ...
isolated geographically, politically, economically.' They also provide a sense of community
where authors share ideas and readers see what their peers are working on." MARCEL C.
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the faintness of reflected glory, that may mean little in practical terms.7 9
Physical association of articles may actually be dysfunctional as it often imposes unwanted material on (not infrequently, paying) readers and may create the false impression that a given field is comprehensively covered." In
any event, many legal scholars read legal articles on their own as either reprints, photocopies or online documents, totally oblivious to what else is in
a particular journal number. The success of (especially printed) law reviews
in preserving legal scholarship for posterity should also not be taken for
granted. In libraries across the country, thousands of law review volumes are
disintegrating thanks to the "slow burn" of acid in their pages. Some law
reviews now use acid-free paper, but even that cannot protect legal scholarship against the potentially-devastating ravages of fire, vandalism and normal
reader "wear" (the last two of which can actually make the most famous of
articles the hardest ones to find in readable condition). Finally, publishing an
article in a law review which can be formally cited in, say, the Index to Legal
Periodicals,hardly ensures that it will be found when needed. Categorization
in print-based (or even certain electronic) legal indexes can be quite misleading. Even if an article is properly indexed under the current system, there is
no guarantee that the printed law review containing it will be on the shelf,
actually available for consultation.
The other fundamental problem with the "value added" argument is
that it overlooks the virtual certainty that the values alleged to be "lost" by
electronic self-publishing will simply be secured in the new system by other
means - means which will work just as well as (if not better than) their
print-based/law review-based antecedents. For instance, self-publishing
scholars who desire the benefits of good editing - and who wouldn't?8 , will probably place greater reliance on computerized spelling and grammar
LAFOLLETTE, STEALING INTO PRINT: FRAUD, PLAGIARISM AND MISCONDUCT IN SCIENTIFIC

PUBLISHING

77 (1992).

79. Take, for instance, articles appearing in the Law and History Review. "Medievalists"
are likely to read its articles on English legal history, and "Americanists" are likely to read
its American oriented articles. The co-presence of both types of article in a single journal
will in practical terms be irrelevant to many, if not most members of both groups.
80. Readers of the Law and History Review and its counterpart, the American Journal of
Legal History, will therefore tend to assume that they are "keeping up" with the legal history
field. This is certainly true to some extent, but the very existence of these publications,
combined with the fact that good articles on legal history are regularly published in other
journals in law and in history (where they can easily be overlooked), inevitably distorts the
prevailing perception of where exactly "the field" is. Precisely because of this, the organizers

of the H-Law electronic discussion list for legal history have begun to post references to
relevant articles not appearing in the primary legal history journals. See H-Law: Law JournalsTable of Contents, <http://h-net2.msu.edu/-law/journal.reviews/> (visited Oct. 24, 1996).
81. As initially advanced in Last Writes?, my electronic self-publishing proposal was
designed to allow legal scholars to sidestep law review editing; I never meant to suggest that
editing per se was undesirable or unnecessary.
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checkers, taking advantage of the very computer technology which enables
them to self-publish in the first place. At least in the short term, they will
probably also arrange to have their work thoroughly checked by research
assistants who, unlike law review staffers, could be hand-picked for their
academic backgrounds in particular areas, would be directly responsible to a
scholarly author for the quality of their editing, and would lack the technical
wherewithal to set their own mistakes in print.8 2 Scholars wishing to have the
form and substance of their citations verified could pursue similar alternatives, relying on a combination of software citation-checkers83 and research
assistants. 84 Scholars wanting to give various readers the opportunity to examine a set text of their work without having to "freeze" it would merely need
to support the current version of their documents with previous versions:
given the capacities of electronic storage, nothing would have to be thrown
away. For example, Version 1.0 of Last Writes? - now superseded by Version 1.1 - is still stored on my own Web site, and is still available for downloading on demand. Not only would such storage enable other scholars to ensure that they were all citing, quoting or consulting the same version of a particular text (a point that especially concerns Trotter Hardy 5 ), but it might provide useful insight into an authoring scholar's thought process over time.
In an electronic self-publishing system, registration, distribution/
publicization, association, preservation, citation and location would likewise
be achieved in new ways. Work would be informally registered with the legal community by posting a precisely dated version of it online. In a developing Internet culture, lawyers and legal academics would overlook online
postings at their peril (attorneys on various e-mail discussion lists have al82. It almost goes without saying that absent the "net" of law review staffs, electronic selfpublishers will also be more careful in editing their own work. To this extent, suggestions
that self-published scholarship will resemble the less-than-editorially-perfect drafts of work
that often arrive in today's law review offices are off the mark: they fail to recognize that
eliminating the law reviews would not merely remove an element of the current editorial
process, but would change the entire editorial equation.
83. Although most legal academics are still unaware of them, these have been on the market
since 1986; their quality has improved considerably since then, and is continuing to improve.
See Mark J. Welch, Software Reviews, 1 HIGH TECH. L.J. 527 (1986).
84. A somewhat more speculative variation on one or more of these strategies might involve
the eventual conversion of existing law school "word processing centers" into in-house lineediting and bluebooking operations (albeit probably staffed by persons hired from editorial
as well as secretarial backgrounds). Arguments in favor of this include the increasing

superfluity of traditional word-processing in an electronically more sophisticated workplace,
and the convenience of having rote editing and formatting functions assigned to trained long-

term employees rather than to transient students. Arguments against the notion include the
cost to students of altogether removing them from the editorial process and the risk of
occasional delays in publication when multiple faculty members seek editorial and formatting
assistance at the same time.
85. See Hardy, supra note 23, at 250-51.
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ready suggested that not consulting the Internet on certain legal matters may
amount to malpractice). Alternatively, formal registration of self-published
articles might be achieved by listing them with, adding them to, and/or having them "digitally time-stamped" (along the lines of the physics model) by
a central Website/databank of electronically self-published legal scholarship,
perhaps run (as I proposed in Last Writes?8 6) by the Association of American
Law Schools. 7 Self-published legal scholarship would be electronically distributed (or, perhaps more accurately, made distributable) to an international
and interdisciplinary public potentially far larger than the readership of any
current subscription-based law review. Organizing a central scholarly
databank would make it possible to publicize legal articles by general (perhaps even regular) e-mail announcements of new works in particular areas or
by particular authors.8 8 Electronically self-published articles (and their authors) would be associated with one another through their joint appearance on
subject-based e-mail notification lists from the databank, through their copresence in databank sub-directories of scholarship in particular subject-areas (e.g. "Constitutional Law"), or in the results of computerized rank-based
searches of the database or the Net as a whole. Somewhat more ambitiously,
individual scholars wishing to keep up to date with writing in their fields but
not willing to spend a lot of time searching for online resources in an ever-expanding database or waiting for centralized notifications could use "intelligent agents" - computerized research assistants carefully programmed by
their users and released onto the Internet - to not only find and report back
on all existing materials fitting a certain disciplinary profile (and only that
profile), but to alert their programmers to all new relevant postings.9" Works
86. See supra note 29, at para.4.10.
87. In Last Writes? I referred to this central databank as an "archive."

On reflection, I

prefer the former term, as the root metaphor of a "bank" suggests that the central site holds
objects that (thanks to revisions and, as we shall see infra, comments) are dynamic and will
increase in value over time, rather than objects that are finished and are put away solely for
preservation.
88. A regular e-mail notification service might be the electronic equivalent of the present
law review "issue" insofar as many legal scholars use those for notification more than for

reading. On the importance of the "issue" concept, see Thomas Bruce, Swift, Modest Proposals,
Babies, and Bathwater: Are Hibbitts's Writes Right?, 30 AKRON L. REV. 243, 246-47 (1996).
89. To the (limited) extent that legal journals provide their readers with a sense of
"community" (see supra note 78), "community" in a self-publishing system would be (re)created by the dynamics of the self-publishing enterprise; on a day-to-day basis, a given legal
scholar's "community" would be the readers who commented on a particular piece, and the
authors of those other pieces who have chosen to hypertextually link their own work to it.
Ultimately, a given self-publishing legal scholar might belong to multiple self-generating
communities of this sort, rather than having to adopt (not to mention having to pay for
membership in) the relatively artificial communities provided by journal subscription lists.
90. See, e.g., Rick Hauser, Net Watch Top Ten - Intelligent Agents/Information Agents,
<http://www.pulver.com/netwatch/topten/tt9.htm> (visited Sept. 2, 1996): "Good agents will
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of self-published legal scholarship would be preserved electronically at their
own sites and/or in the (presumably more secure) central databank: safe from
many physical ravages that affect paper, backed up and even "mirrored" as appropriate, 9' they could remain intact and legible indefinitely.9 2 Finally, electronically self-published articles might not be cited in the traditional printbased indices, but they would nonetheless be locatable through subject-,
author- and/or keyword searches of the general Internet indices (e.g., Yahoo,
Altavista, Hotbot) which many law professors and attorneys are already using or, less circuitously, through similar searches of the anticipated central
databank and/or its sub-directories. Alternatively (or additionally), electronically self-published articles could be traced through a new generation of subject-specific Internet search engines (e.g. Hieros Gamos,9 3 Web-Cite94 ) which
instead of replicating restrictive, journal-only print indices, seek out both selfpublished and journal-published electronic materials. As Trotter Hardy notes,
certain Internet addresses might occasionally prove problematic, 9 but given
allow people to spend less time searching for information - and more time utilizing or
analyzing 'good' information that is 'auto-retrieved'." In a sense, scholarly journals are very

dumb (i.e. non-programmable, insufficiently-selective) "intelligent agents" in their own right.
91. The physics preprint archive at Los Alamos will shortly be duplicated at 20 mirror
sites all over the world. E-mail from Paul Ginsparg to Bernard Hibbitts (Sept. 30, 1996).
92. "[T]he HD-ROM recording technology, developed at Los Alamos [National Laboratory,

the site of the pre-print physics archive], can attain storage densities over 100 times those of
current CD-ROMs, and, by using materials such as stainless steel or iridium, can guarantee
stability for tens of thousands of years, and provide resistance to fire water damage, rats, and
other disasters that can destroy paper data." Andrew Odlyzko, On the Road to Electronic
Publishing <http://math.albany.edu:8800/hm/emj/papers/road> (visited Sept. 2, 1996). See
also Andrew Treloar, Scholarly Publishing and the Fluid World Wide Web, <http://
www.deakin.edu.au/-aet/apwww95/apwww95.html> (visited Sept. 2. 1996): "The durability
of Web documents is unknown, but there are no technological reasons for their life to be
limited in any way."
93. Hieros Gamos Legal Publication Database, <http://www.hg.org/pub-print.html>
(visited Aug. 30, 1996).
94. Welcome to Web-Cite, <http://www.web_cite.com> (visited Sept. 2, 1996).
95. The technical basis of current Internet citation - the Uniform Resource Locator, or
URL - stands in need of revision. It locates material not by its inherent content characteristics,
but rather by its specific physical location on the Net. As Clifford Lynch explains, "[tihis is
like citing a printed work by referring to the holdings of a specific library, stored in a specific
place in the stacks of that library." Clifford A. Lynch, Integrity Issues in Electronic Publishing,
in SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING, supra note 38, at 136. The consequences of this system are
obvious: move a file to another location, and it is "lost" until its new URL is determined and/
or existing hyperlinks to it are corrected. By itself, however, this somewhat awkward
arrangement need not undermine my proposal for the co-ordinated electronic self-publication
of legal scholarship. In the short term, URL changes can be publicly reported and "followup" links to new sites provided by Web posters (as is done already); in the long term, the
URL system as a whole will likely be replaced by an alternative, "portable" system of citation
centered on so-called "URN"s (Uniform Resource Names) or "URC"s (Uniform Resource
Characteristics). See generally Clifford A. Lynch, Uniform Resource Naming: From Standards
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current Web-authoring customs, the chances of getting a bad (and, more
importantly, untraceable 96) address would in practice be much less than the
chances of finding that a particular printed law review is "out," is being
bound, or is otherwise unavailable. Electronically self-published papers
might not have page numbers to direct readers to particular areas of text, but
(like Version 1.1 of Last Writes?) they would have unobtrusive paragraphnumbers which would actually allow for much more exact citation. In these
and other ways, the electronic self-publication of legal scholarship would not
in practice require giving up the "value added" by present publication procedures; indeed, legal scholarship would likely emerge from the self-publishing process with its own value considerably enhanced.
2. Quality Control
The second article of the Jeopardy Thesis asserts that by displacing law
reviews, electronic self-publishing would precipitate the collapse of quality
control. Richard Delgado, Henry Perritt, Trotter Hardy and David Rier all
claim or at least suspect that with no editorial boards to impede anyone from
publishing anything, over-enthusiastic legal scholars would mar legal literature and complicate legal research by flooding the legal academy with junk.97
In a sense, this quality control point is but an especially-contentious
particularization of the value-added point - it posits that the law reviews
currently contribute a specific value (in this instance, quality screening and
certification) to the literature without which it would mushroom and deteriorate. As is the case with other values, however, the worth of the current quality
control system is overstated. In particular, the concept of law students exercising quality control over legal scholarship borders on the oxymoronic. 9
Student law review editors are second and third year apprentices in a sometimes-learned, sometimes not-so-learned profession. Yes, there are a few

to Operational Systems, 20 SERIALS REV. 39 (Winter 1994); Treloar, supra note 92, at p.4.

96. As of this writing (September 2, 1996), it is unfortunately (and perhaps ironically)
impossible to trace Trotter Hardy's own Journal of Online Law from its original site on the
Cornell server (<http://www.law.cornell.edu/jol/jol.table.html>) to its new site at William
and Mary (<http://warthog.cc.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/>) (on the re-location and its
problematic consequences for a hypertext connection in Version 1.0 of "Last Writes?", see
Hardy, supra note 23, at 257). Not only is there no "follow-up" link on the Cornell site, but
there is no mention of the move, leaving visitors unaware that the old site has been superseded.
97. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 23, at 235 ("Internet publishing could easily wind up
like TV, with a mass of indigestible material with a few gems thrown in.").
98. It is noteworthy in this connection that law is the only discipline in which students are
given this kind of academic authority. The thought of even Ph.D. candidates in the Arts and
Sciences (many with 5-10 years experience in their specific disciplines) overseeing scholarly
publication in their respective fields would be considered preposterous.
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areas about which they may know something (e.g. constitutional law, generally a required course in second- and sometimes first-year), but there's a great
deal of legal and non-legal ground about which they know nothing. However
hard they may work at it, they have taken on an evaluative task for which they
are simply not prepared: 99 in these circumstances, much of what they prefer
to publish turns out not to be what is academically best or innovative or remarkable, but what is recognizable (to them), what is "safe" or alternatively
fashionable, what is written by familiar "names," what catches their fancy on
stylistic grounds, or what will cause them the fewest hassles at cite-checking
time. The fact that good articles do appear in the "best" student-run law reviews does not gainsay this point. Many good articles also appear in "lesser"
student journals, and many articles that run in the "best" student journals are
(dare I say) not that good.' 00
If quality control by students is problematic, however, traditional quality
control by peers may not be that much better. Although only a marginal
phenomenon in legal scholarship, "peer review" in general suffers from many
well-documented shortcomings: poorly- or arbitrarily-selected reviewers; 0 '
99. A number of commentators in the present collection acknowledge this point. See e.g.,
Hardy, supra note 49, at 251 ("students are often not qualified to assess an article's merits or
contribution to the field"). See also Ross, supra note 75, at 262, discussing (in light of his
own experience as a legal historian) student difficulties in determining whether a submitted
article makes a unique contribution to the legal literature or has been "pre-empted" by an
article published elsewhere ("one law review editor informed me ... that my 38-page article
on the legal career of John Quincy Adams was pre-empted by another article on the very

same subject. When I asked for the citation to this supposed pre-emptive piece, the editor
directed me to a two-page ABA Journal article about the legal career of Adam's father, John
Adams.").

100. To the extent there is a discernible general difference between articles in top-ranked
student-edited journals and articles in bottom-ranked student-edited journals it must be
remembered that even in a multiple-submission system, publication fora are to some degree

self-selected by law faculty. In other words, articles in the Harvard and Yale law reviews
may on average be better than articles appearing in the law review of ***** law school, but
that's because law professors are more likely to send their best (or at least more) of their
work to the former journals, and only their less impressive products (if any) to the latter.
101. On editorial arbitrariness, see, e.g., Steve Fuller, Cybermaterialism, or Why There Is
No Free Lunch in Cyberspace, 11 INFO. SOCIETY 325, 331 (1995) ("[A]ny intellectually
current editor will know to whom manuscripts should be submitted, depending on whether
the editor wants a favorable or unfavorable . . . assessment.").
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reviewer anonymity, 0 2 partiality, 0 3 fallibility, 0 4 or overwork;0 5 a systemic
bias against innovation; 0 6 lengthy delays; unavailability of reviews to general
readers; and even occasional editorial dismissals of peer verdicts. 0 7 In prac102. Malcolm Atkinson, Regulation of Science by Peer Review, 25 STUD. HIST. AND PHIL.
Sci. 147, 155 (1994) ("In reality the cloak of anonymity, concealing uncertain 'peer' status
and possible vested interest, confers licence to indulge whims and express opinions that the
referee might not care to defend publicly."). See also Alexander Berezin at el., Lifting the
Pernicious Veil of Secrecy, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 11, 1995, at 46 ("in all others areas of
human endeavour [sic] (the arts, sports, politics) criticism, even the most harsh, is invariably
open."). In this connection it is curious that anonymous peer review has taken hold at all in a
legal community where formal allegations must be made by identifiable sources before being
considered credible in court.
103. See Mary Biggs, The Impact of Peer Review on Intellectual Freedom, 39 LIBR. TRENDS
145. 153-55 (1990) (discussing reviewer partiality based on gender difference, politics,
institutional affiliation, general intellectual perspective, and career considerations).
104. See, e.g., Michael E. Peskin, Reorganization of the APS Journals for the Era of
Electronic Communication, <http://golum.riv.csu.edu.au/-94013332/project/project-two/jnl/
[Jiournals often
18.htm> (visited Sept. 2,1996) ("this system is prone to breakdown ....
publish incorrect papers, which we uncover in compiling bibliography, in answering our
students misperceptions, and in refereeing new papers based on these results."). Multiplying
the number of reviewers in the hopes of reducing the likelihood of error does not necessarily
solve the problem. A former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine conducted a
study which revealed that the possibility of two different referees agreeing was only slightly
better than chance. See Benjamin D. Singer, The Criterial Crisis of the Academic World, 59
Soc. INQUIRY 127, 133 (1989). A former editor of a Canadian historical journal encountered
an even more concrete difficulty at one point: "I sent [a manuscript] out to two well-published
scholars whom my journal had dealt with before. One replied that the manuscript was the best
thing he had ever read on the subject .... The other reader replied that the manuscript was of
such poor quality that it would not even be acceptable as a chapter in a mediocre MA thesis."
Brett Fairbairn, The Present and Future of Historical Journals, 27 J. SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING
59, 62 (1996).
105. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 104, at 133 ("there is a constant overload of papers and
too few reviewers available ... the best reviewers often are overloaded and refuse to take on
additional assignments so that, by default, persons with little experience may determine what
is published.").
106. Examples from the sciences are disconcertingly-legion. "The work of S.A. Berson,
MD, and Yalow on radioimmunoassay, which.., eventually led to a Nobel Prize, was initially
Requests for funding for research on in vitro fertilization were
rejected for publication ....
repeatedly turned down by the peer review process. Steptoe and R. Edwards, Ph.D., funded
the research personally and as everyone knows it ended in practical success." David Horrobin,
The Philosophical Basis of Peer Review and the Suppression of Innovation, 262 J. AM. MED.
Ass'N 1438, 1440 (1990) (listing 16 other instances). See also Berezin, supra note 102, at
46 ("[I]n the 1960s the Canadian chemist John Polyani had his paper on molecular reactions
rejected by Physical Review Letters as 'having no scientific interest'. . . . [I]n 1986 he won a
Nobel Prize for Chemistry for the work."); Robert Matthews, Storming the Barricades, NEW
SCIENTIST June 17, 1995, at 38, 40 ("Brilliant but unorthodox papers can be rejected for
years, a fate that famously befell the work of American biologist Lynn Margulis on the origin
of eucaryotic cells in the late 1960s, and the American theorist Mitchell Feigenbaum's seminal
work on chaos theory ten years later.").
107. For instance, the "prestigious" New England Journal of Medicine, sometimes prints
studies panned by both its assigned reviewers. Neal B. Freeman, Peer Review and Its
Discontents, WEEKLY STANDARD, Aug. 26, 1996, at 29.
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tice, it lets in much of the "dubious data and poor prose"'' 0 it is supposed to
screen out; precisely because of this, much scientific literature in particular
is comprised of well-deserved trashings of other scientists' published work.
Growing appreciation of peer review's problems has recently led Nobel Prize
winners,109 journal editors' 10 and many rank and file scholars in various
fields"'I - not to mention some prominent lay observers" 12 _ to call for its
reformation or outright elimination. Those who still consider peer review an
academic sacred cow tend to forget that it is a relatively recent historical
phenomenon. Its roots may go back to the eighteenth century, but it was only
embraced by most disciplines in the twentieth." 3 It is definitely not a necessary precondition of good science (a la Copernicus, Newton or Darwin" 14) or

good scholarship (a la Gibbon, Smith, or Russell)." 5 In fact, the historical

rationale for peer review ultimately has less to with guarding academic stan-

dards than with making scholarly journals profitable," 16 keeping the support
108. Re-engineering PeerReview,

THE ECONOMIST, June

22, 1996, at 78, 79.

109. Singer, supra note 104, at 127. According to Nobel prizewinner Rosalind Yallow,
"There are many problems with the peer review system. Perhaps the most significant is that
the truly imaginative are not being judged by their peers." Id. at 132.
110. Richard Smith, the editor of the British Medical Journal, "[says] that only 5% of what
peer-reviewed journals publish is credible, the rest being 'rubbish'." Lawrence K. Altman,
The Inglefinger Rule, Embargoes and JournalPeer Review - Part1, 347 LANCET 1382, 1385
(1996).
111. See, most recently, J. Scott Armstrong, We Need to Rethink the EditorialRole of Peer
Review, CHRON. OF HIGH. EDUC., Oct. 25, 1996 at B6 (based on J. Scott Armstrong, Peer
Review for Journals: Evidence on Quality Control, Fairness and Innovation, SCIENCE AND
ENGINEERING ETHICS (forthcoming, 1997)).

112. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 107, at 29; Re-engineering, supra note 108, at 78.
113. For example, "peer review became the standard in biomedical journals in the Englishspeaking countries and at least some places in continental Europe, such as the Netherlands
and Switzerland, not long after World War II .... ." John C. Burnham, The Evolution of
EditorialPeer Review, 263 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1323, 1327 (1990).
114. In a more recent context, it's been noted that "the fundamentals of quantum mechanics,
organic synthesis and DNA structure managed to be discovered without the blessing of peer
review." Rustum Roy, Alternative to Peer Review?, 212 Sci. 1338, 1338-39 (1981).
115. James M. Banner Jr., Preserving the Integrity of Peer Review, 19 SCHOLARLY
PUBLISHING 109, 110-11 (1988).
116. Most modern scholarly journals are commercial enterprises; peer view supports them
economically insofar as it reassures their publishers that they are printing a "quality" product
that will be bought by readers. Without peer review, publishers are afraid that they might
print "bad" articles which would lead them to lose their reputations and their paid subscribers.
See generally James M. Banner, Preserving the Integrity of Peer Review, 19 SCHOLARLY
PUBLISHING 109, 110 (1988). In this connection it is interesting to note that what is often
credited as the first instance of modern peer review was undertaken in 1752 when the Royal
Society of London assumed fiscal responsibility for its PhilosophicalTransactions. David A.
Kronick, Peer Review in 18th-Century Scientific Journalism, 263 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1321
(1990).
On the basis of these points and observations one might frame the following "economic

Winter 1996]

YESTERDAY ONCE MORE

of wealthy patrons - be they aristocrats or government agencies," 7 and ensuring that academic editors maintain politically-tenable positions in their
own fields." 8 Circumventing this form of quality control by electronic selfpublishing would not be as risky as one might think. Indeed, it might be desirable.
Electronic self-publishing, however, would not require the circumvention of quality control itself. Over and above the presumed continuation of
such "informal" checks as work-in-progress colloquia and draft reviews by
colleagues," 9 that control (like other "added values") would simply be exercised -

and its benefits secured -

by new and improved means. For in-

stance, quality in an electronic self-publishing system could be maintained via
a system of post hoc reader comments, submitted by e-mail and then (for the
information of both authors and future readers) attached 21 to self-published
theory" of peer review: the incentive for pre-publication peer review rises with the cost of
(i.e. financial risk assumed in) publishing scholarship. Conversely, as cost (and risk) decreases
- say, with Internet self-publishing - the incentive for pre-publication peer review does
likewise.
117. "[A] [further] historical reason for disciplining scientific communication was to ensure
that the scientists' aristocratic patrons were not necessarily confused or offended. The
aristocrats supported scientific societies in order to be amused, edified, and, in some cases,
technically empowered. Peer review instituted the decorum needed to persuade patrons that
their money was well spent." Steve Fuller, Cyberplatonisin: An Inadequate Constitution for
the Republic of Science, 11 INFO. SOCIETY 293, 299 (1995).
118. In other words, peer review essentially allows academic editors to "pass the buck" of
responsibility for not publishing a given paper to a set of anonymous colleagues. As a result,
editors can avoid becoming the objects of personal resentment and recrimination when the
volume of submitted scholarship in their (sub)field grows to the point where they cannot
accept all submissions. See Fuller, supra note 101, at 331 ("[l]f enough of the right mix of
referees are chosen, the editor can hide his or her hand in the process entirely.").
119. Contrary to what David Rier seems to think, there is no reason to presume that these
pre-circulation controls would be abandoned in a self-publishing system. See Rier. supra
note 27, at 208-10. Indeed, there is reason to believe that they would become more important
than ever (along, perhaps, with such high-tech variations as "trial-ballooning" on electronic
discussion lists). For a testimonial to the effectiveness of pre-circulation quality control by
colleagues in particular, see Ross, supra note 75, at 264. ("I found, for example, that my
colleague and fellow legal historian David J.Langum offered a far more detailed and useful
critique of my legal history books than did any [peer] reviewer of the books. One's faculty
colleagues, of course, could just as easily critique a law review article or a self-published
work.").
120. "Attachment" might take place in several ways. As a start, electronically selfpublishing legal scholars might manually attach e-mail responses to their own work (see, for
instance, the "Reader's Forum" section of Last Writes?, (Version 1.1, June 4, 1996) <http://
www.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/readlw.htm>). Eventually, the organization or institution providing
the central databank for self-published legal scholarship could maintain a separate database
for comments, linked from any given paper, but removed far enough from it technically to
ensure that authors could not manipulate or illegitimately "filter" comments posted. It has
recently been suggested that to facilitate dialogue, a comments database should actually become
a general feature of the Web, in effect allowing any user to add a comment to any web
document; those comments could then be viewed (or ignored) by other users at their discretion.
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articles as appropriate.12' Good articles would presumably receive good comments; bad articles would receive bad comments, or no comments. 2 2 The
prospect of receiving no comments, or bad comments which would then be
publicly posted with the original work (a sort of academic "scarlet letter")
would be a powerful disincentive not to post poor quality work in the first
place. Such a "post hoc peer review" system is not at all revolutionary. A
variant already operates in several print-based scholarly journals, and in
somewhat attenuated form it is, of course, the foundation of current book
review practice. Ultimately, it would probably function better than traditional
pre-publication peer review: it would not suppress or create obstructions for
innovative or experimental papers, it would expose scholarship to the comments of all legal scholars (as opposed to just a few chosen peer reviewers),
and it would make readers' comments available for all to see (providing useful
information to later readers while reducing the chances of arbitrary review in
the first place). Insofar as it could operate indefinitely, this quality control
system would also be able to adapt to continuing changes in an electronicallypublished article's text. Of course, the system's success would ultimately
depend upon the willingness of other scholars to participate. Some scholars
might choose not to - David Rier, for instance, would recuse himself on the
assumption that inviting such commentary is asking others to do one's own
work.' 2 3 But this is no different (and, given the more advanced stage at which
it would take place, probably better) than the tradition of asking colleagues to
read drafts, or, for that matter, the practice of sending drafts to student boards
for routine editing and cite checking. Many people would probably take advantage of the opportunity to comment on papers that they thought were worth
the effort. Not only would that enable them to have a direct, immediate and
public impact on others' work, but it would demonstrate their unselfish comSee Misha Glouberman, Adding Comments to the Web, <http://www.muchmusic.com/
muchmusic/cyberfax/annot.html> (visited Sept. 7, 1996).
121. As Tom Bruce points out elsewhere in this Special Issue, readers might also rule on
the merits of an electronically self-published piece by including it on lists of "recommended
papers" posted on their own web pages. Bruce, supra note 88, at 246. This has already
begun to happen (indeed, I included a number of such lists on my own homepage when I
posted that in January 1996, see <http://www.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/commun.htm>) but, it is
not likely to be as rigorous or as informative to other readers as a system of directly-appended
reader comments.
122. Electronic publication "promises to make it evident when a paper is of utter
inconsequence to the community by spawning no reactions, or hostile and nonconfirming
ones." Robert Silverman, The Impact of Electronic Publishing on the Academic Community,
in SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING supra note 38, at 55, 63. See also Gary Taubes, Peer Review in

Cyberspace, 266 SCi. 967 (1994) ("[If no comments at all are attached to a paper] there can
be only two reasons. Either nobody cared to read it, or nobody cared to comment positively.
In either case, it's either wrong or not even wrong, which for our purposes is equivalent."
(quoting Paul Ginsparg)).
123. See Rier, supra note 27, at 208.
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mitment to the ideal of scholarship as dialogue.
In a self-publishing system, quality control would also be enforced by
self-policing. Electronic dissemination of legal scholarship on the Web would
expose law professors' work to the world: in this context, even leaving aside
the threat of public sanction through negative reader responses, self-interest
would suggest that law professors post quality material lest they publicly
embarrass themselves and do serious damage to their own academic reputations. Quality control through self-policing of this sort is not a pipe-dream.
The scientific community already relies on self-policing to prevent most instances of fraud. 24 Self-policing has also succeeded in more specific settings.
In the early 1960s, several hundred biomedical scientists from around the
world organized themselves into so-called "Information Exchange Groups"
focused on specific subject issues. Group members submitted their papers and
communications to a central office in Washington D.C. which immediately
passed them on to all other participating group members. No editors intervened in the process, although slanderous statements of a personal nature were
eligible for return to authors at the discretion of the project Chairman. In the
wake of the project's premature termination in 1966,125 one participant recalled: "In the early days, many believed that the IEGs would be outlets for
a flood of rubbish. This flood never materialized. When a communication is
to be scrutinized by 700 or more experts, only a fool would risk presenting an
inferior article ....The quality of the communications was certainly no worse
than the quality of the published literature, and this despite the absence of
124. Ann C. Schaffner, The Future of Scientific Journals:Lessons from the Past, 13 INFO.
239, 243 (1994) (noting that falsification of raw data generally cannot be
detected in the peer review process).
125. The project was terminated after the editors of five prominent biomedical journals
agreed not to publish papers previously circulated within the IEGs. The journal editors cited
their concerns about dual publication, copyright infringement and misunderstanding of nontraditionally published results. None of these arguments was justified, however; in practice,
they hid "the fact that the editors were apprehensive that the status and prestige of the journals
would be downgraded if another agency (IEG) were distributing to its members, from six
months to a year earlier than the journals, the very papers which would eventually appear in
" Green, supra note 52. at 86.
the journals ....
Law review editors contemplating a similarly-prohibitive strategy in the face of electronic
self-publishing of legal scholarship might usefully reflect on their institutional raison d'etre:
is it to serve the legal and academic communities, or is to serve themselves? Fortunately, the
editors who have considered this question thusfar have chosen the former interpretation: see,
for instance, the editors' note to Bernard J.Hibbitts, Last Writes? Re-assessing the Law
Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 615, 616 n.** (1996) ("The New York
University Law Review has always been mindful of its role in shaping legal discourse and its
continuing obligation to be responsive to the changing legal environment . .. While our
traditional publication policy has been to accept original works that have never been published,
an exception was made for Professor Hibbitts' [electronically self-published] article . ...
Our print publication of the Article reflects . . . the continuing commitment of the Law Review
to extend the range of legal discourse." ).
TECH. AND LIBR.
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reviewing or editorial selection.' ' 26 A similarly-successful self-policing
system exists today in the physics community: the electronic archive of physics preprints that I described earlier effectively looks after itself- there is no
quality control problem at present, and according to the archive's founder, "no
likelihood" that one will develop.127 In this context, it's clear once again that
protecting and preserving the quality of "published" scholarship does not
depend on the survival of established academic periodicals, law reviews included.
Even in the unlikely event that those skeptical of my electronic selfpublishing proposal were right in their contention that eliminating law reviews would result in a significant loss of quality control, it's doubtful that
such a loss would have the devastating impact they fear. Good articles would
still be written by responsible law professors and lawyers; the "problem,"
supposedly, would be how to find those good articles amidst the bad ones that
would hypothetically "flood" the academy. In a print-based self-publication
system finding better work would admittedly be difficult - it would be possible only after wasting a good deal of time and effort leafing through and
trying to evaluate second-rate material. The electronic self-publishing system I outlined in Last Writes?, however, could easily cope with bad articles,
effectively shunting them aside and saving scholars the inconvenience of
having to read them or even see them. It could do this by taking advantage of
its capacity to elicit and carry reader comments. A ranking system could
easily be developed wherein self-selected reader-evaluators would rank an
article on a 1-10 scale. Alternatively, the organization running the projected
databank of self-published legal scholarship could come up with a comprehensive ranking based on the comments received. Scholars could profitably
use this information in constructing electronic searches: thus, instead of asking the databank to list everything on a particular topic, a scholar could instruct it only to list articles above a certain ranking. 28 The databank might
126. Green, supra note 52, at 83.
127. E-mail from Paul Ginsparg to Bernard Hibbitts (Sept. 30, 1996). See also Ginsparg,
FirstSteps, supra note 49 ("Some members of the community have voiced their concern that
electronic [self-]distribution will . . . encourage dissemination of preliminary or incorrect
material . . . [But] the electronic form once posted to an archive is instantly publicized to
thousands of people so the embarassment over incorrect results ... is, if anything, increased.").
Skeptics have suggested that the high quality of the physics preprints may be due to the fact
those papers are ultimately destined for the formal physics journals, and that their authors
have simply "internalized" the control standards of those publications. If a professional
community has truly internalized control standards, however, nothing should happen if the
agent of control (i.e. the journal structure) is actually removed.
128. This scheme of numerical ranking (and searching by rank) was originally suggested
for electronically-published articles in the sciences, and has recently been proposed for adoption
(on an experimental, voluntary basis) in the physics preprint archive. See Richard C.
Roistacher, The Virtual Journal, 2 COMPUTER NETWORKS AND ISDN SYs. 18, 120 (1978);
Taubes, supra note 122. Applied to law, such a system could theoretically become very
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actually contain more (low-quality) articles than it would list pursuant to such
an instruction, but those would be rendered irrelevant and invisible to the
point where, far from being concerned about "flooding," scholars might not
even be aware of their existence. Ultimately, such a system would probably
be used as a time-saver as much as a junk-filter: busy scholars faced with an
array of reader-classified "quality" articles in a particular area might plausibly rely on rankings to identify the one or two "best" pieces, just as some
currently tend (somewhat more arbitrarily) to choose "elite"-published articles on a subject over articles on the same subject appearing in non-elite law

reviews.

29

3. Prestige
The third concern voiced by adherents of the Jeopardy Thesis - most
forcefully, by David Rier - is that elimination of law reviews in favor of electronic self-publication would deprive law professors in particular of the
academic and even professional prestige derived from publishing in highlyrespected journals. 3 0 In other words, they would no longer benefit from the
"boost" of a good placement.
There are several problems with this contention. Not least of these is its
somewhat unseemly nature. If law reviews are to be retained, they should be
retained because they serve scholarship or further a pedagogical purpose, not
because they can make particular law professors "look good" and "get ahead"
in the strictly-careerist sense of that term. Somewhat less idealistically (given
the importance of prestige in fact), it should be noted that placement-based
prestige is in limited supply - a relatively few members of the legal academy
get the opportunity to publish in prestige-generating journals. To this extent,
most legal academics publishing elsewhere have no prestige to lose by opting for another, in many respects better, system of scholarly communication.
Those skeptical of electronic self-publishing must finally admit that even
under the existing system, prestige isn't everything. In particular, prestige
will not necessarily win someone tenure and promotion - at many American
law schools, scholarship is judged not according to where an article is placed,
but rather according to how good evaluators (especially external evaluators)
sophisticated: a reader might be able to request an article's overall rank, its ranking by
specialists in a particular sub-field (using, for instance, AALS lists), its ranking in specific
aspects (quality of argument, depth of research, originality, etc.), its ranking over certain
periods of time, its ranking by practitioners or academics in associated disciplines, etc.
129. In a variant on this system, readers might even rank the comments of other readers;
this would allow later, interested viewers of an article to make intelligent selections from the
mass of responses that might accumulate over time. See generally Glouberman, supra note
120.
130. Rier, supra note 27, at 204 ("[Plrofessors, especially those not yet tenured, can ill
afford to 'opt out' of a game that determines their professional fate.").
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deem it to be.131 This not infrequently results in non-elite-published and even,
on occasion, as-yet-unpublished(and unplaced) articles getting good reviews,
and well-published "prestigious" articles getting trashed. The authors of the
former tend to be elevated; the authors of the latter tend not to be.
Have no fear, however - in the age of cyberspace, prestige is not going
to evaporate into thin air. Electronic self-publishers may by definition be unable to gain prestige through placements, but they will nonetheless obtain it
from the electronically-recorded reactions and comments of their colleagues.
A "prestigious" self-published piece will be one that many scholars consult
and/or revisit (judging from its "counter"), one that numerous scholars or
institutions include as a link on their own sites (a form of Web citation, if you
like 3 2), one that stimulates widespread commentary and debate as evidenced
by attached e-mail messages, and/or one which succeeds in eliciting positive
comments from many scholarly readers (or from a few high-profile ones). All
four sources of prestige would in fact be more impressive and academically
more legitimate than the process that purports to confer prestige at the moment. Take just one example: from a prestige perspective, would you rather
have your article on legal history published by students in the Columbia Law
Review, or electronically self-published on the Web with positive comments
133
from Morton Horwitz, Bob Gordon and Barbara Black?... Me too.
4. Education
The fourth objection that exponents of the Jeopardy Thesis make to electronic self-publishing focuses on the alleged pedagogical cost to law students
of supplanting the law review. Tom Bruce, Howard Denemark and Gregory
Maggs all hold that law review service educates law students in legal research
and writing, appraises them of significant issues in the legal community, and/
or hones their analytic judgment. They suggest that without retaining the law
review in at least some form, students would suffer.
This concern for the pedagogical welfare of law students is highly commendable (indeed, I share it), but do law reviews really accomplish all that
their partisans claim? A growing number of disgruntled law students say
not. 13 4 Moreover, if law review experience is pedagogically fundamental, why
131. This does not make student editing and selection of articles any less problematic
under the present system, however. Even if students do not necessarily control how professors
are formally evaluated, they do largely control how many people see a particular article (e.g.
a Harvard selection guarantees a wide audience) which for scholarly and overall career purposes
is just as bad if not worse.
132. See supra note 121.
133. Cf Rier, supra note 27, at 206.
134. Witness the scathing comments from former law review staffers from Georgetown,
quoted in Last Writes?, supra note 29, at para. 2.23. In a recent discussion of the value of law
reviews on the law student newsgroup bit.listserv.lawsch-L, a law review student from an
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is it not offered to more - even all - law students?' 3 5 Would those skeptical of electronic self-publishing suggest that non law-review students are
receiving a substandard legal education? If not, they cannot claim that eliminating the institution would do significant pedagogical damage. The skeptics
should also remember that other common law educational systems - in
particular, England, Australia and to some extent Canada - function very
well without student-edited law reviews. Would anyone seriously suggest
that graduates of these systems are legally less capable than their American
counterparts?
Shifting to a system of electronic self-publication of legal scholarship
does not demand, however, that law students lose the pedagogical benefits
which the law review was to some extent designed to serve. If the law review
itself were felt to be a unique incubator of legal research and writing skills,
law schools could always choose to retain it in modified and limited form as
a vehicle of student scholarship. It could be reduced to a collection of student
Notes,'3 6 or perhaps a compendium of seminar papers. Alternatively, legal
analysis, legal research and writing, and even "currents in contemporary legal thought" could be explicitly taught in a wider range of classes, seminars
or independent studies. Not only would such undertakings allow students to
approach those subjects directly and comprehensively rather than indirectly
and haphazardly, but it would save money as compared to the present system
(in other words, it would be more "cost-effective"). Law students wishing
"elite" eastern law school analogously suggested that "the duties of a journal member could
be performed by a chimpanzee of average intelligence." Re: Law Review, how is it run at
your school (visited Sept. 18, 1996), <bit.listserv.lawsch-l>. Not surprisingly, many law
students doing this sort of work don't like it very much: in the words of a disgruntled law
review student from Stanford, "[v]ery few people seem to enjoy law review as an activity.
Confidential e-mail to Bernard Hibbitts, Oct. 24,
Most see it as purely instrumental ......
1996. In these circumstances, a significant number of good law students are actually foregoing
the opportunity to serve on law reviews. See Re: Law Review, How Is It Run at Your School,
bit.listserv.laswch-L (Sept. 18, 1996) (law student stating from personal experience that "many
students with high grades do not even try out for law review because they think the chores of
law review are not worth their time.").
135. As early as 1949, Harvard law professor Warren Abner Seavey complained that "from
the standpoint of the school it would be better if every other man on the [Harvard Law]
Review was a low C man - if more poor men could do the kind of work that is done by the
Review. The Review men need the training least of all. The Review might go to hell, but from
the standpoint of education it would be better if half your men were selected from those who
got seventy or below, or by lot." ELEANOR KERLOW, POISONED Ivy: How EGOS, IDEOLOGY
AND POWER POLITICS ALMOST RUINED HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 21 (1994) (quoting Seavey).
Expansion of staffs and the proliferation of "spin-off" law reviews have recently extended
the base of student participation at many American law schools but, at most, "law review"
remains a limited opportunity.
136. A prototype for this sort of publication is Cornell's "liibulletin-ny" [Legal Information
Institute Bulletin - New York] service, started in the Fall of 1995: second and third year law
students write case comments on significant decisions of the New York Court of Appeals and
make them available to interested readers over the Web and by e-mail. See <http://
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more intensive, hands-on training in any specified skill or area could apply for
research assistantships with productive legal scholars in their schools. In that
capacity they would get an intellectual and academic work-out certainly as
good as, and - given close faculty supervision - arguably better than any
available in contemporary law review offices.' 3 7
5. Employment
Finally, we come to the pi~ce de risistanceof the Jeopardy Thesis: the
argument (here offered by Tom Bruce and Howard Denemark) that without
the credentials provided by the existing law review structure, law graduates
may have difficulty finding jobs. It is clear that many contemporary employers favor students with law review experience.'3 8 It is less clear why they do
that. They may believe that a year or two of reading academic articles, editing drafts and checking citations makes one a better lawyer. They may believe
that service on a law review board helps acclimate law students to the teamwork and effort expected in corporate legal practice. They may even be biased towards law review students as a result of what Bruce terms "nostalgia"
- hiring partners in law firms may (justifiably or not) look back with fondness on their own law review experiences of five, fifteen or twenty-five years
ago, and may be tempted to hire students who in retrospect remind them of
themselves.
Will electronic self-publishing of legal scholarship wreck this symbiotic
relationship between law review staffers and law firm recruiters? Not at all.
In the first place, as I indicated earlier, law reviews may in some sense survive a faculty move towards self-publication by limiting themselves to the
publication of student-written material. In this context, students would still
be able to acquire the editorial and organizational skills that recruiters allegedly value; they will also remain the objects of nostalgic envy and displaced
identification. But even if the law review collapsed completely as an institution, students would still get hired. They would get hired on the basis of their
grades. They would get hired on the basis of their writing skills. They would
www.law.cornell.edu/bulletin/indep.htm>.
137. This would be especially true under my internalized "value added" system, in which
student RAs would do editorial work under direct professorial supervision. See supra Section
II.C.1. Even under the current system, see Value of Law Reviews, bit.listserv.lawsch-L (Nov.
11, 1995) (law student "not convinced that [law reviews] do much to improve research and
working as a research
writing skills, at least in comparison to other activities, e.g.,
assistant for a professor.").
138. There is, however, evidence to suggest that some employers do not value law review
membership as much as they used to, in part because of how law review staffers are now
selected at some schools. For instance, a law review student at Stanford recently told me that
despite what he and many other law review members thought going in, "not many interviewers
seem to be impressed by law review. This is probably explained by the fact that [at Stanford]
grades play no role in law review membership; a writing competition determines membership."
Confidential e-mail to Bernard Hibbitts, Oct. 24, 1996.
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get hired on the basis of their interests, their backgrounds, their work ethics,
their recommendations, their interviewing skills, and their personalities. Law
firms hired law students for these reasons before there were law reviews, and
they will hire them for these reasons after there are law reviews. One might
even suggest that they actually hire them for these reasons now: especially
given how students get onto and advance up law review boards, law review
service is in many ways a cipher for many other credentials. 39 Taking away
the cipher would ultimately encourage more direct examination - and perhaps more accurate assessment - of qualities that really "count."
A working electronic self-publication system would moreover generate
new ways of resume-building forjob-seeking law students. Given that many
law review editors would likely become RAs in a revamped scholarly production structure, they would have an opportunity to perform - under supervision - many of the same editorial and research tasks they do now. As RAs,
they would also secure the benefit of (hopefully, good) recommendation letters from law faculty intimately familiar with their editorial and research work
- letters that should be worth more to employers than letters from satisfied
authors 4 0 who might have dealt with a given law review editor only a handful of times while he/she (and perhaps others) were working on the author's
article. Being practical people, law firm recruiters would not take long to
adjust to these new realities; indeed, they would probably come to appreciate
them.
D. The Futility Thesis
In general terms, Hirschman's "Futility Thesis" asserts that regardless
of its inherent merits, a given reform will be deemed inadvisable by'some of
its detractors because it supposedly cannot be accomplished given the forces
and obstacles arrayed against it.' 4 ' Rhetorically, the Thesis affords individuals the chance to conjure with an idea while allowing them to avoid endorsing it by pointing out bureaucratic, political or social impediments beyond
their control. In the present collection of commentaries on Last Writes?, the
139. "If you are on the law review, employers may assume you are either one of the brightest

in your class, or an outstanding writer-or both [emphasis added]." LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS
COUNCIL, THE OFFICIAL GUIDE TO US LAW SCHOOL, quoted in Denemark, supra note 34, at
223.
140. See Maggs, supra note 23, at 239-40. The letters that Maggs refers to are the "dirty
little secrets" of the law review business; the potential of securing one subtly encourages
student editors (especially at elite law schools) to publish established names whose
endorsements would carry the greatest weight with prospective professional and academic
employers. See, e.g., KERLOW, supra note 135, at 24 ("The greatest advantage Review members
had .. was the built-in opportunity to develop personal relationships with faculty members.
This could come through ... editing an article submitted by professors. To secure a clerkship
to an appellate judge, nothing was more valuable than having a Harvard Law professor write
an editor a letter of recommendation.").
141. See generally HIRSCHMAN, supra note 24, at 42.
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Futility Thesis is most obviously incarnated in Tom Bruce's suggestion that
even if the electronic, Web-based self-publishing of legal scholarship were a
goal worth pursuing, it might be difficult if not impossible to achieve given
the likely indifference, intransigence or outright hostility of contemporary law
school faculties and administrations (what Bruce calls the "tenacity of the
existing culture" 4 2 ). Expressed somewhat more positively, the Thesis asserts
that the time for change has not yet come.
In theory, electronic self-publishing might be stymied both materially
and normatively. Material obstacles might manifest themselves in oblivious
or overly-cautious law schools failing to provide their faculties with the technological and financial support necessary for faculty members to either selfpublish independently, or, more ambitiously, orchestrate a self-publishing
system through the creation of a central scholarly databank. The infrastructure for the first of these initiatives, however, is already bought, paid for, in
operation or at least imminent in many (if not most) American law schools.
All law professors have to do is use it.' 43 As to the second ostensibly more
ambitious initiative, that is not nearly so difficult to undertake (or easy to stop)
as some might presume. The Internet which supports the World Wide Web
was originally designed to be decentralized. Military scientists constructed
it so that independent computers operating at any of its nodes would have the
capacity to access, organize and deliver information all over the network.
Today, this same capacity theoretically gives individual scholars at law
schools all over the United States the technological ability to organize electronic databanks potentially holding or linking to thousands of self-published
electronic articles. Given existing Web connections and existing law school
servers, the cost of doing this (initially on a volunteer, part-time basis) would
be close to zero - much less than that generally associated with undertaking
a print-based project such as a new law review. In this context, legal scholars interested in launching an experimental electronic databank might easily
end-run administrators or colleagues who might not wish to undertake such
an experiment themselves.
"End-running" may not be necessary, however. As of August 1996, a
global consortium of law firms called Lex Mundi has developed (as part of its
Hieros Gamos Web indexing initiative) a limited archiving ...and notifica142. Bruce, supra note 88, at 243.
143. For what it's worth, discussions with my own Dean about the present article (then
still a work-in-progress) prompted him to convert our "Word Processing Center" into a
"Document Technology Center", and to request the director of that Center to commence
training her staff in the preparation of Internet-ready (HTML) documents for the purpose of
helping interested faculty publish their own work on Web servers at the Law School or
elsewhere. Letter from Peter Shane to Bernard Hibbitts (Sept. 16, 1996) (on file with author).
144. Make an Entry: HG Legal Publications Database, <http://www.cgsg.com/hg/
p_enter.html> (visited Aug. 30, 1996). Similar services exist in other fields: note, for instance,
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tion 45 service enabling legal scholars to directly link their self-publications
to an evolving databank searchable by other legal scholars or by members of
the public. Readers reporting their subject-preferences are advised every time
the database registers a new article in their areas of interest. The Lex Mundi
system could arguably be improved in various ways, in particular by incorporating reader commentaries and evaluations which could be used to refine the
search process, but the basic point remains: as I write these words, a framework for a generalized system of legal self-publishing is already in place,
whether certain law school Deans and faculty members would welcome it or
not.
Although by definition literally "immaterial," the normative obstacles
allegedly in the way of electronic self-publishing of legal scholarship are
potentially more serious than their material counterparts. Tom Bruce puts the
problem bluntly: "unless merit, tenure and promotion committees begin to
recognize and actively encourage electronic publication, electronic publication will not take place on a useful scale."'1 4 6 Is this recognition and encouragement likely to be forthcoming? Bruce suspects not, but I'm more optimistic. In the first place, administrators and senior scholars on these committees
- not to mention the university officials that oversee them - may turn out
not to be as conservative or hostile as Bruce and others presume. A few of
them (especially Provosts and central administrators from hard sciences like
physics) may be engaged in self-publishing themselves. A larger number may
at least come to appreciate its many scholarly benefits'4 7 and/or acknowledge
the comparative rigor of a process that not merely distributes scholarship but
intentionally and immediately exposes it to critical public comment. Some
senior officials may recognize the political and potentially financial advantages of being seen to endorse a powerful scholarly option presented by the
latest technology. 48
' Others may insist- heaven forbid! - on continuing to
evaluate colleagues' scholarship on its merits, as opposed to how or where it
is published. The composition of "tenure and promotion committees" is also
Web-Cite, a self-archiving service for the literary and cultural studies community. Submit a
link to Online JournalArticle, <http://www.webcite.com/Forms/Journalltem.html> (visited
Aug. 30, 1996).
145. Subscribe/Unsubscribe:HG PersonalizedE-Mail Notice, <http://www.cgsg.com/hg/
hgnote.html> (visited Aug. 30, 1996).
146. Bruce, supra note 88, 243.
147. See supra, Section II.A.

148. In a slightly different context see Joseph M. Moxley & Lagretta T. Lenker, Introduction,
to THE POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF SCHOLARSHIP 1, 3 (Joseph M. Moxley & Lagretta T.
Lenker eds., 1996) ("If academic institutions hope to be honored and supported
. . . then faculty will be encouraged to participate in computer-related research . ...
Academics just cannot stick their heads in the sand on this issue - that is, if they hope to
come up for air.")
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bound to change over time:' 49 as that change occurs and as those bodies bethey will be more
come inevitably more Net-literate ("Neterate") themselves,
150
strategy.
self-publishing
accepting of a Neteracy-based
The second reason why I'm relatively optimistic about the chances of
overcoming normative obstacles in the way of electronic self publishing is
related to the likelihood that early self-publishing legal scholars will probably
take a two-track approach to publication. In the short term, along with putting their work Qnline, most will continue the practice of sending it to printed
law reviews in order to reach their entrenched, largely non-Neterate audiences.15' Last Writes?, for instance, was posted on the Web and also submitted
to (and accepted by) the New York University Law Review.'52 Not incidentally, such a strategy will allow self-publishing scholars to "cover" themselves
in the eyes of their colleagues, who will therefore be less likely to reject selfpublication itself out of hand. In the meantime, it will gain strength and credibility as a scholarly option. Eventually, the majority of legal scholars will
149. "[M]ost ... members of university tenure committees belong to the last generation of
scholars not steeped in computer culture .. " Jacques Leslie, Goodbye, Gutenberg: Pixelating
Peer Review is Revolutionizing Scholarly Journals, WIRED, Oct., 1994, at 68, 71.
150. A recent dictum of futurist Alvin Toffler is a propos here despite having been offered
in a slightly different context: "Oh, these ideas are now regarded as zany, kooky, but I believe
that in 10, 15 years, as the entire Internet phenomenon spreads, as more and more young
people come into the system, these proposals are going to become mainstream proposals.
They're not just going to be regarded as these flaky, digerati ideas." Kevin Kelly, Anticipatory
Democracy, WIRED, July 1996, at 45, 187 (interviewing Alvin Toffler). Several decades ago,
the German physicist Max Planck expressed his own faith in future reform rather more
fatalistically: "a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making
them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation
grows up that is familiar with it." Quoted in KUHN, supra note 26, at 151.
151. This does not presume, however, that these self-publishing legal scholars will
voluntarily withdraw or freeze their online texts at the moment of print publication. On the
contrary, many will doubtless wish to continue taking advantage of their original electronic
medium by maintaining and revising the self-published versions of their work post-print. See
infra note 152. Not incidentally, the latter activity will allow those versions to supersede the
printed versions, and will encourage other legal scholars to look to them rather than to printed
copies as the primary objects of academic reading and research. Editors of printed law reviews
tempted to save their institutions by pre-emptively prohibiting maintenance and revision of
electronically self-published papers after print publication (or even, in a more desperate move,
refusing to print any papers previously self-published) are referred to supra note 125.
152. See Hibbitts, supra note 125, at 615. In order to preserve my ability to maintain and
make post-print changes to the self-published version of Last Writes?, I purposefully retained
all electronic rights in the article, except those which would permit NYU to post an electronic
version of the printed article in the event of inaugurating an Internet edition of their journal
(Agreement Between New York University Law Review and Bernard J. Hibbitts, July 30,
1996; the Editors' Note purporting to describe the Agreement is ironically in error insofar as
it indicates that NYU retained unspecified "online rights."). In the interest of extending the
range of legal discourse, and having no electronic edition to protect from what would have
amounted to electronic competition, the NYU Law Review did not object to this arrangement.
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53
gain enough online experience to realize that far from being a last resort,
electronic self-publishing is a first resort that allows them to produce scholarship more easily, more efficiently, more quickly, more cheaply, more accurately, more creatively and more effectively than any legal journal. At this
stage they will abandon formal law reviews as being more trouble than they're
worth.' 5 4

Because large-scale electronic self-publishing of legal scholarship is
already a technologically-viable option, because it may prove to be less than
anathema to established interests, and especially because it will not lead to the
immediate abandonment of the law review, there is no good reason to postpone it to a better, somehow "riper" time. Waiting until everyone is technologically up-to-speed, or until every aspect of the present law review system
is replaced, or until "all parties are convinced they will lose nothing in the
process [of transition]"' 5 5 is simply not necessary. Nor is it advisable.
Progress towards a working system of electronic self-publication will almost
inevitably involve some measure of trial and error. Certainly thought should
be given to what lies ahead, but solutions to the challenges inevitably presented by the new system should also be allowed to develop incrementally.
Because what ultimately works may be very different from what we might
expect to work, we should get started as soon as possible. More fundamentally, delaying the shift to electronic self-publishing to some hypothetical
"right moment" may paradoxically ensure that it never happens. There will
always be someone who (by choice or by force) will stay outside the computerized publication structure. There will always be someone who will insist
(perhaps rightly) that the law review is not and cannot be entirely "replaced."
There will always be someone who will feel that change will not be in their
interest. These people deserve our respect and our sympathy, but waiting for
them would be as counterproductive for us as waiting for recalcitrant scribes
would have been for the pioneering printers of five centuries ago.
E. The Alternatives Thesis
The fifth and final type of argument advanced by those skeptical of the
prescription I offered in Last Writes? may conveniently be termed the "Alternatives Thesis." The proponents of this Thesis present a variety of proposals
which they assert might improve the present legal publishing system without
153. See Delgado, supra note 23, at 233 ("Self-publishing has a long and honorable history
going well back into the age of print. Many authors who could not find a publisher for some
reason simply went ahead and printed their books ... etc. themselves.").
154. See generally Jerry A. Campbell, Choosing to Have a Future, 24 AM. LIBR. 560
(1993) ( "We should be willing to sacrifice any organizational model or specific practice in
order to better carry out our mission.").
155. Bruce, supra note 88, at 247.
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running the risks allegedly inherent in dismantling the law review structure
as we know it. Unlike the exponents of Futility, they believe that some
changes can be made, even if there are not the root-and-branch changes I have
urged.
The alleged "alternatives" run the gamut from the traditional to the
imaginative. The most traditional alternative to electronic self-publishing is
proposed by David Rier, who at one point advocates reforming the existing
law review system by indirectly and directly strengthening formal pre-publication review procedures. If multiple submissions were limited and manuscripts were shortened, he claims that law students would do a more thorough
job of evaluating papers; if more faculty members became involved in editing legal journals or at least supervising the work of student boards, he claims
that the overall quality of review would go up. But these proposals are old
hat,' 5 6 and are themselves unsatisfactory. Radically limiting multiple submissions to, say, three or five at a time would considerably slow the pace of legal scholarship; the process of placing an article (which now takes only a
couple of months, and often less time than that) might ultimately take years.' 57
Imposing a formalized publishing preference for short articles would potentially discriminate against scholars taking non-conformist approaches which
require further elaboration and documentation than conformist writing, the
framework for which is already known and endorsed in the legal community. 5 8 In any event, reducing the workload of student editors does nothing
to make them more educated or more experienced. As to Rier's second suggestion of more faculty editing (or for that matter, more faculty supervising
of student-editing), that is unlikely to take hold as a standard practice so long
as it threatens to impose additional administrative or pedagogical burdens on
156. For similar proposals, see, e.g., Eric Jensen, The Law Review Manuscript Glut: The
Need for Guidelines, 39 J. LEGAL EDUCATION 383, 386 (1989) ("No one should have more

than five copies of any manuscript circulating for consideration for publication at one time.");
James Lindgren, Student Editing: Using Education to Move Beyond Struggle, 70 CHI.-KENT

L. REV. 95, 98 (1994) ("We should also be willing to take on the very substantial work
ourselves of starting faculty journals.").
Very few non-tenured faculty
157. What's more, "the proposal is obviously naive ....
members, living on the edge of faculty review and possible extinction and always desperate
for an acceptance would have the confidence and discipline to limit distribution to five
journals." Arthur Austin, Footnote* Skullduggery** and Other Bad Habits*** 44 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1990).

158. "Everyone who writes or speaks ... knows how much you can get away with as long
as you keep close to received doctrine .... When I refer to Nazi crimes or Soviet atrocities,
for example, I know that I will not be called upon to back up what I say, but a detailed
scholarly apparatus is necessary if I say anything critical about ... the United States ....
This freedom from the requirements of evidence or even rationality is quite a convenience, as
any informed reader of the media and journals of opinion, or even much of the scholarly
literature, will quickly discover .... Evidence is unnecessary, argument beside the point."
Noam Chomsky, Interview, in THE NOAM CHOMSKY READER 1, 36-37 (James Pecked., 1987).
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faculty which would distract them from their own writing. If faculty members
have time to spare, learning how to self-publish electronically would be a
much better professional investment. Finally, to the extent that faculty editing presumes peer review, Rier is asking legal scholars to climb onto a bandwagon precisely when a critical mass of his colleagues in the sciences are
clamoring to get off. 5 9 Prudent legal scholars should beware.
A slightly more novel alternative to electronic self-publishing is put
forward by William Ross, who suggests that legal scholars looking for new
avenues of intellectual expression should consider publishing books. Books,
of course, enjoy revered status in the academic pantheon. They represent the
culmination of years of thought and work, and as such are (hopefully) major
contributions to scholarship. They offer professional editing, editorial continuity, peer review (for good or ill) and even the possibility of revising one's
work in later editions. By definition, however, they are not an alternative to
articles, which are the focus of my electronic self-publication proposal. Many
good ideas that are perfectly suited to abbreviated discussion in an article
would lose much of their punch in book format. Books take longer to conceive and produce, which is one reason why articles and journals came into
existence in the first place. In several respects, books are also weaker than
articles as a practical medium of legal scholarship: as Ross himself admits,
"many law professors read law review articles far more avidly than books."'6 °
In law, books don't even carry a guaranteed prestige advantage: Ross
corrrectly notes that "most law professors would receive more prestige and attention from theirs peers by publishing with a top-ten law review than with a
second-string publisher."''
Even if books did not suffer from these disadvantages, using them as a
professorial "escape hatch" from law reviews would be complicated by the
fact that the current market for academic monographs is very, very tight, and
getting worse all the time. University presses under severe financial constraints are no longer accepting the number of manuscripts that they did even
five years ago. 62 The manuscripts that many are accepting fit a particular,
159. See supra notes 101-17 and accompanying text.
160. Ross, supra note 75, at 260.
161. Id.
162. "Increasingly, presses are saying that they simply cannot afford to publish monographs.
Over the last five years, for instance, the list for one of the top five academic presses in the
country moved from 70 percent monographs to only 30 percent and falling." The Endangered
Monograph, PERSP., Oct. 1995, at 3 (American Historical Association Newsletter). See also
Peter Applebone, Publishers' Squeeze Making Tenure Elusive, NY TIMES, Nov. 18, 1996 at
A I (reporting that "university presses are cutting back, sometimes drastically, on publishing
specialized monographs."); James Shapiro, Saving "Tenure Books" from a Painful Demise,
CHRON. OF HIGH. EDUC., Nov. 1, 1996 at B6 (noting that "[i]t is hard to imagine a grimmer
time in which to get a 'tenure book' accepted.").
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63
somewhat problematic profile: popular, topical, lightly documented 1 works
- generally by established, publicly-recognizable academic authors - that
64
Most law profesare more likely to pay for themselves in the marketplace.
sors are not well-known outside their specific areas of expertise; many do not
produce, do not want to produce or do not wish to be confined to producing
books of this sort. 65 Opting for book publication under these circumstances66
would force most legal academics to derail their own scholarly agendas.
This is clearly not acceptable.

Somewhat more visionary is a third alternative explicitly advanced by
both Henry Perritt 6 1 and (as a futuristic setting for the implementation of his
more traditional proposal) David Rier: 65 shift the locus of legal scholarship
from printed law reviews to electronic journals ("e-journals"). Taking the
basic idea one step further, Perritt even suggests making electronic self-publication a preliminary step in a new electronically-based law review production structure.169 Of course, electronic journals are Internet entities capable
163. On the relationship between "commercial" academic releases and the decline of
footnotes, see William H. Honan, Footnotes Offering Fewer Insights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14,
1996 at B9 ("noting that 'to compete more effectively [in the retail book market], university
press editors began packaging their books more attractively, and that meant.., fewer footnotes
.... "). In the age of hypertext, however, the rumors of the footnote's demise may turn out to
have been greatly exaggerated. Internet publishing actually privileges "footnoting" insofar as
it values hyperlinked material over non-hyperlinked material. Hyperlinks, of course, are
little more than footnotes (usually without numbers or formal citations) that directly take one
to another part of a single text, or outside that text altogether. Not only are hyperlinks more
powerful "connectors" than footnotes ever were, but readers might be able to "mask" hyperlinks
in ways that will allow scholars to include as many hypertextual "footnotes" as they wish for
the benefit of highbrows without necessarily frightening or alienating lowbrows. In other
words, members of different reading audiences will be able to tailor the appearance and
content of Internet texts to suit themselves.
164. "Most [presses] would like to publish the broader second and third books by wellknown authors of monographs .... " The Endangered Monograph, supra note 162, at 3. See
also MacLelland, supra note 33, at 8-9 ("University presses, faced with meshing production
costs with audience demand, tend to publish well-known names .... Because they can no
longer afford the financial risks involved in publishing unknown authors, many university
presses are excluding from the dialogical context the very voices which may have produced,
or may be producing, the best and most significant scholarship.").
165. This is not to suggest that such publications have no proper place in the legal literature.
They clearly do. Whether they should become the core or basis of that literature, however, is
another matter entirely.
166. In the current book-publishing environment, "the people who determine what subjects
up-and-coming academics get to write about - and who in effect award tenure and the right
to shape the next generation of scholars - are Barnes & Noble customers." Judith Shulevitz,
Keepers of the Tenure Track, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1995, at 46, 47 (Book Review).
167. See, e.g., Perritt, supra note 57, at 57 ("[lit probably is appropriate for student edited
reviews to migrate to the Web.").

168. Rier, supra note 27, at 212.
169. Perritt, supra note 57, at 257.
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of multimedia and other technological innovations. 70 They also have the
social and political "advantages" of being relatively recognizable to users,
being compatible with existing scholarly practices, and being (for the most
part) protective of existing academic and publishing hierarchies. Building
self-publication into electronic legal journals' submission and editorial processes would save mailing and transmission time and would ostensibly allow
legal scholars to have their cake and eat it too, i.e. take advantage of selfpublishing while preserving the basic law review system.
Having said all this, electronic legal journals and this notion of "preliminary" self-publishing are both problematic. Let's take preliminary self-publishing first. A legal scholar posting her articles online for the sole purpose
of having them considered, selected, edited by and eventually "published" in
some electronic law journal' 7 ' would in practice be sacrificing most of the
benefits of the technological skill she would have bothered to acquire. Assuming with Perritt that the editors of most electronic law journals would not
tolerate an electronic self-publisher maintaining or revising the electronically
self-published - and by definition directly competing - version of an article
after formal e-journal publication, 7 2 that preliminarily self-publishing legal
scholar would be handing over to others the final say over editing, design and
dissemination when she could have had that herself. She would also be abdicating direct control of post-publication changes and (most likely) giving
up republication and duplication rights. In sum, she would be allowing a
fully-representative, up-to-date, dynamic and mobile statement of her ideas
to be replaced with something less. This would come close to constituting
academic negligence; the self-publisher would be better advised to leave wellenough alone. Any legal e-journals that might permit co-publication by electronic self-publishers in the interest of securing particular articles or in the
hope of setting an altruistic example for other journals would be courting
disaster: they might retain their readerships for a little while, but regularly
peddling soon-superseded (or, at best, redundant) products would ensure their
collapse in the long run. In either case, the practical benefits for preliminary
self-publishers passing their work products along to e-journals would be limited. Judging by current realities, legal e-journals would have no technological edge over self-publishers, would have access to no larger a potential audience, and might in some instances reduce the actual circulation of papers by
170. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text (on advantages of the Web as a publishing
platform).

171. On electronic self-publication as possibly both a prelude and a follow-up to publication
in a printed law review, see supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
172. See Perritt, supra note 57, at 257 (discussing how preliminarily self-published papers
would be "locked" and officially "published" by transferring them onto the Web sites of
electronic legal journals).
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demanding that would-be readers "register" or pay subscription fees. At
bottom, the very concept of self-publication as a prelude to e-journal publication is a bit odd. One wonders whether its proponent, transported to the
fifteenth century, would have advised legal scholars to have their works commercially-printed as a step towards having them copied by scribes," 3 or (just
as nonsensically) re-distributed by printers based in monasteries.
Altogether apart from preliminary self-publication, electronic legal journals themselves may offer scholars less than conventional wisdom currently
suggests. At the moment, there are relatively few of them. Most of these are
simply Web-based extensions of existing print publications which replicate
all the faults and delays of the print-based editorial structure. Legal e-journals which have no independent print existence are more promising, but they
too have critical limitations. Insofar as they can currently be counted on the
fingers of one hand, relying on them for publication would require many legal scholars - especially those working in areas outside the "law and technology" field - to wait years before enjoying the benefits of the Internet.
Moreover, most of the current "electronic only" law reviews have an Achilles heel: they are still student-edited. The one faculty-edited American electronic law journal (the Journalof Online Law, edited by Trotter Hardy) is not
likely to have many counterparts until American law faculty start volunteering for editorial assignments in significant numbers, which is not likely to
happen anytime soon. Even were it to happen someday, faculty editing would
delay publication and inevitably would not be foolproof.'7 4
The greatest weakness of the electronic law journal, however, is that it
is still a journal - as such, even in its "pure" variety, it is but a late twentieth century electronic imitation of a seventeenth century print publishing format which I suspect is fundamentally incompatible with its own electronic
environment. As demonstrated by the Web in particular, that environment
allows and already rewards ongoing revision of work product: 75 Web authors
173. There is some evidence that the Abbot Trithemius actually took this view. See supra
note 7 and accompanying text. At one point in his book In Praise of Scribes, he wrote that
"the devoted scribe should ...guarantee permanence to useful printed books by copying
them ... His labor will render mediocre books better, worthless ones more valuable, and
perishable ones more lasting." TRITHEMIUS, supra note 6, at 65. Printing was thus
contemplated as the first rather than the last step in the publication process.
174. Recall the discussion of "peer review" supra in Section II.C.2.
175. Thanks to the Internet, "the notion that discourse must be fixed to be valid will fade."
James J.O'Donnell, The Virtual Library: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, in GATEWAYS,
GATEKEEPERS, AND ROLES IN THE INFORMATION OMNIVERSE 19, 25 (Ann Okerson and Dru
Mogge eds., 1994). See also Jerome McGann, Radiant Textualit,, <http://etext.lib.virginia.edul
etcbin/browse-mixedosi?id'MCG027&tag'public&images'/lv6/OSl/archive/images&
data'/lv6/OSI/archive> (visited Sept. 9, 1996) ("[U]nlike paper-based forms, electronic texts
are volatile and open-ended. This means that the 'work-in-progress' becomes a defining
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who periodically revise, update and improve their Web sites tend to get more
traffic and more return for their efforts than Web authors who do not. In the
age of cyberspace, many scholars will want the same flexibility 7 6 - not
merely to attract attention and extend the intellectual "shelflife" of their
work,' 77 but also to ensure that their words continue to be accurate representations of themselves and their ideas. 7 8 Yet any legal e-journal which permitted legal scholars to revise their work at will would be committing institutional suicide: by surrendering editorial control, it would become a platform
for self-publication in fact if not in name. Those legal e-journals which attempt to preserve their editorial integrity by requiring proposed changes to be
approved in advance' 7 9 may eventually find themselves no better off. If their
policies do not end up alienating (and driving away) Neterate legal scholars
trying to attract or hold on to readers by keeping their work current, they will
impose huge burdens on editors trying - with fixed amounts of manpower to review an ever-increasing number of change requests coming from an everincreasing number of scholars. In this context, e-journals attempting to save
mode for scholarly writing. Of course scholarship ... is a long journey, but the hypothetical
structure of knowledge - knowledge as a continual pursuit rather than an archived condition
- gets increased emphasis through these new forms of study and expression.").
176. Admittedly, some might not - they might (like Trotter Hardy) prefer to publish a
piece and be finished with it. Hardy, supra note 23, at 251. Legal scholars would certainly
be free to adopt this attitude, but they would risk losing comparative advantage to others
taking a more active, dialogically-responsive approach to their work.
177. In the current publication system, many if not most articles become little more than
"museum pieces" within 10 years of initial publication. If scholars had the option of
periodically updating and revising their articles, those could remain relevant for a far longer

period of time, to the benefit of both writer and readers. The sheer quantity of scholarship

produced might decline somewhat (perhaps not such a bad thing), but its quality and longterm utility would arguably increase dramatically. In such an environment, academic
achievement might even come to be judged "not [by] past publications . . . but [by] the
number of existing publications that are still being developed and maintained with new
material." Antony Barry, Publishing on the Internet with World Wide Web, <http://
snazzy.anu.edu.au/CNASI/pubs/CAUSE94.html> (visited Sept. 2, 1996).
178. "There is scarcely a page I have published in a decade and a half of scholarly writing
that I would not now change if I could, but I cannot. Words that I know to be inadequate and
in some instances untrue continue to speak for me, who am no longer the person I was when I
wrote them, but I am still somewhat their author; I must be, because I once was." O'Donnell,
supra note 175, at 24.
179. This recent statement by a commercial editor reflects something of what publishers
(and journals of all sorts) have at stake here: "Editors like me spend most of our day
reconceiving, rechecking, and rewriting what someone else has already conceived, checked
and written. And it's not that I don't trust my authors - if publishers didn't have great
respect for their authors' insight, intelligence, and dedication, why would they publish their
books? It's simply that . . . authors and publishers have different areas of expertise ....
I work for a publisher that has a reputation for quality - and I find it hard to imagine us

publishing anything ... that we felt reflected poorly on us." Denise Wydra [Senior Editor,
Bedford Books] to WEBRIGHTS-L, June 6, 1996.
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themselves by providing electronic conveniences (in this instance,
revisability) comparable or superior to those already enjoyed by self-publishers may only succeed in putting themselves out of business.
Ultimately, I believe that legal e-journals (and electronic journals in
general) are an evolutionary dead-end. 80 They are publishing's "horseless
carriages" - archaic forms which attempt in their very name to reconcile the
past and the future, but which serve neither well.'' Their comparative recognizability discourages complacent or unwitting legal scholars from seizing or
even appreciating many of the exciting new publishing opportunities afforded
by Internet technology. In this age of the Information Superhighway, however, each of us has a choice: we can update traditional modes of transportation, keep the carriage-makers going and eventually get run over, or we can
get out of our conceptual rut, take control of our scholarship, and start building
8 2

Ferraris.
A fourth alternative, mooted if not discussed in detail by both Richard
Delgado and William Ross (the latter offering his second option), would theoretically accept self-publication as a final rather than simply preliminary
format for legal scholarship, but would only recommend it for certain types
of scholarly material. Delgado's comments unfortunately offer little guidance
as to what kind of articles he would consider fit for "occasional" self-distribution over the Internet. Ross is somewhat more specific, suggesting that
180. See Michael Giles, PresidentialAddress - From Gutenberg to Gigabytes: Scholarly
Communication in the Age of Cyberspace, 58 J. POLITICS 613, 614 (1996) (noting that "the
conversion of scholarly journals from a paper to an electronic format . . . has tended to
obscure the more far-reahing implications of the internet. It is my thesis that the emerging
technology of the internet will fundamentally alter the structure of scholarly communication.");
Paul LeBlanc, Pulling Out the Rug: Technology, Scholarship and the Humanities, in THE
POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF SCHOLARSHIP 115, 119 (Joseph M. Moxley & Lagretta T. Lenker
eds., 1996) (speculating that electronic journals may represent "a short-lived analog from
print culture.").
181. As Marshall McLuhan so astutely reminded us in the 1960s, the content of a new
medium of communication is always imagined (initially) to be an older medium. MARSHALL
MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA iX (1964). Not only were automobiles initially seen as
horseless carriages, but television was initially regarded as a vehicle for broadcasting movies,
and printing was initially seen as a faster means of reproducing manuscripts. Today, consistent
with this tradition, the Internet is primarily (mis)conceived in academia as a medium for
delivering scholarly periodicals.
182. Derek Law, The Electronic Message to Scholarly Publishers: Adapt or Obsolesce, 6
LOGOS 67, 72 (1995). The shift from institutions to individuals as the primary locus of
publishing activity may only be facilitated by the speed at which Internet publishing technology
evolves. Already journalists are talking about "Internet time", the accelerated rate at which

new Web browsers and other applications are developed and enter the marketplace. Change
is occurring so fast that it is almost impossible for actual or would-be publishing organizations
to keep up: by the time they collectively decide to take one step, the technology has advanced
by another. In this situation, autonomous individuals may be the only agents able to make
consistent use of the latest publishing innovations.
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papers with limited readerships, of only "current interest" (e.g. articles on
pending or just-decided cases, or on legislative revisions) or otherwise having only a short shelflife might be well-suited to personal online dissemination.
There is something to this notion of limited self-publication. For one
thing, it implicitly recognizes that certain legal academics dealing with certain subjects in certain ways will likely be drawn to electronic self-publishing ahead of their colleagues." 3 It also recognizes that Internet-based selfpublishing is especially attractive for articles on "ephemeral" subjects that
might lose much of their topical value while moving through the editing and
printing stages of traditional journals. To limit self-publishing in the manner
proposed, however, would be to miss most of its potential. As demonstrated
earlier in this article (as well as in Last Writes?), all legal scholars can profit
from the proposition, and the discussion of all subjects can be advantaged.
The apparent "ephemerality" of a process moreover does not predetermine the
"ephemerality" of its product. After all, paper-based printing was quite properly considered ephemeral in the scribal, parchment-oriented culture of the
fifteenth century, 84 but that hardly compromised print's future as the universal format of scholarly record.
The fifth, final and most forward-looking alternative outlined in this
collection of essays is that set out by Gregory Maggs. With a gracious nod to
Last Writes?,8 5 he foresees that law professors will turn to self-publication
for all sorts of legal scholarship; he nonetheless recommends that law
reviews be retained in certain residual roles. 8 6 In Maggs's view, law review
staffers might carry on as Note writers, article reviewers, symposium
organizers, and/or article editors. I agree with the first two of these proposals; indeed, I made them myself in Last Writes?,'8 7 and I have already restated
183. "What types of individuals are potential agents of Internet use in the scholarly
communication system? Generally, it would be those who have ties that overlap generational,
occupational or knowledge groups." Charles A. Schwartz, The Strength of Weak Ties in
Electronic Development of the Scholarly Communication Systen, 55 COLLEGE & RES. LIBR.

529, 535 (1994). See also Peter Martin, How New Information Technologies Will Change the
Way Law Professors Do and DistributeScholarship" 83 L. LIBR. J. 633_41 (1991) (discussing
how four categories of legal scholars - "Professor Lawyer", "Professor Humanist", "Professor
Social Scientist" and "Professor Internationalist" - are likely to approach electronic media
in different ways, at least initially).
184. "The printed book is made of paper and, like paper, will quickly disappear. But the
scribe working with parchment ensures lasting remembrance for himself and for his text."
TRITHEMIUS,

supra note 6, at 35.

185. Maggs, supra note 23, at 237.
186. Id. at 238.
187. "[D]irect professorial publishing on the Web would not in itself prevent law students
from continuing to publish a law review, if they or others deemed the educational experience
sufficiently useful and important. Law students might, for instance, turn to publishing print
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one of them here.8 8 Law reviews could certainly survive as collections of
student writings. They might even survive as true student "reviews" of selfpublished faculty articles, performing that evaluative mission along with
individual faculty readers (although one wonders what weight they would
ultimately carry in that context). In both these scenarios, however, scholarly
self publishing would still have led to the end of the law review "as we know
it."

89

I am less certain of the desirability or even feasibility of having law
review staffers carry on either as organizers of symposia or as editors of ("tobe-self-published") articles. Bringing scholars together to discuss a related
set of issues is certainly an important function in the contemporary legal academy (one which the editors of the Akron Law Review have in fact undertaken
here), but the quality of the resultant scholarly conversation is often only as
good as the judgment and the erudition of those who orchestrated it in the first
place. Students may not be in the best position to select participants or even
topics, just as they may not be in the best position to select ordinary articles.
Eliminating the law review as a sponsor of symposia would furthermore not
result in the demise of the symposium genre as a whole. In all likelihood, enterprising law faculty would continue to organize such "meetings of minds"
much as they do now, soliciting specific colleagues to write on particularlytopical or significant issues (and sometimes publishing their contributions in
edited books). Finally, I imagine that in a self-publishing universe, scholars
would be brought together in other more efficient and satisfying ways. The
possibility of attaching reader comments to electronically self-published papers 9' could to a certain extent turn every article into a symposium in itself,
making student-sponsored dialogue superfluous. On a larger scale, scholars
searching a central legal databank could instantly assemble collections of subject-specific self-published articles for themselves' 9 1 which would be just
as - if not more - substantively co-ordinated as many current symposia. It
is also highly likely that future developments in Internet- and videoor electronic law journals for themselves, using them as vehicles for circulating the best in
student papers from their own law schools to the legal community at large." Hibbitts, supra
note 29, at para. 4.14. Alternatively, "[T]he law review.., might.., continue as a collection
of student-written reviews or, somewhat less ambitiously, a student . . . selected list of
recommended self-published articles. This format might prove very appealing in an
information-rich environment; in this context, law review staffers along with individual
professorial (post hoc) peer reviewers would be performing a function somewhat akin to
book or film reviewers who judge and comment on works after the fact, without having any
control over whether or how they appear." Id. at n.258.
188. See supra note 136.
189. See Hibbitts, supra note 29, at para. 1.
190. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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conferencing technology (building from today's listservs, MOOs and CUSeeMe applications) will make it easy for scholars to organize a greater number of "live" academic gatherings on their own without third party assistance.
The same technology, complete with electronic whiteboards and other
worksharing devices, might even prompt legal scholars to step beyond the
symposium format and write more papers in active collaboration with one
192
another.
Having law review staffers stay on as editors of faculty prose is similarly
problematic. In the first place, that proposal presumes that law review staffers would voluntarily continue to do the "dirty work" of legal publishing
without having control over article selection or final presentation. Under
these circumstances, most would probably abandon the law review office'9 3
and simply work as RAs, where they could have the advantages of both pay
and direct supervision of their work (not to mention public acknowledgments
and reference letters, the two incentives Maggs associates with law review
service' 94 ). In the second place, Maggs's argument in favor of continued law
review editing assumes that an unsupervised law review staffer would do the
same quality of editorial work as an RA hand-picked by and directly responsible to a completely independent self-publisher. To the extent that assumption is debatable, law professors would be unlikely to avail themselves of the
service. In the third place, Maggs's scenario does not take into account the
likelihood that if it did prove attractive, relying on law review staffs as glorified secretarial pools would likely create backlogs of unpublished, unedited
articles; student editors would then have to select some articles over others,
which would informally give them much the same degree of control over
publication as they enjoy at the moment. For many law professors, an "alternative" which would lead to such a result would be no alternative at all.
As in the three historical instances Hirschman considered in his own
work, the "rhetoric of reaction" generated by my proposal to reform the existing law review system through the electronic self-publication of legal
scholarship turns out, for the most part, to be a rhetoric of overstatement,
misapprehension and mistake. None of the five theses so vigorously advanced
192. See Duncan Sanderson, Cooperative and Collaborative Mediated Research, in
COMPUTER NETWORKING supra note 55, at 95.
193. See generally G.P. Thomson & John R. Baker, Proposed Central Publication of
Scientific Papers, 161 NATURE 771, 772 (1948) (noting, in the context of a somewhat similar

1948 proposal for the central deposit and distribution of scientific papers, that "[i]t is extremely
unlikely that editors would continue to undertake all the functions they now discharge, largely
without payment and from love of their subject, if their power and prestige were diminished
to the extent proposed"). See also Ralph Phelps & John Herlin, Alternatives to the Scientific
Periodical, 14 UNESCO BULL. FOR LIBR. 69 (1960).

194. Maggs, supra note 23, at 239.
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by the skeptics - Denial, Perversity, Jeopardy, Futility, or Alternatives ultimately withstands scrutiny. Instead of having no discernible benefits, as
the Denial Thesis claims, electronic self-publishing turns out to have many.
Instead of threatening to make things worse for legal scholars, as the Perversity Thesis claims, electronic self-publishing promises to make things better.
Instead of imposing numerous costs on law professors, lawyers and law students, as the Jeopardy Thesis claims, electronic self-publishing imposes very
few (and in some respects, none at all). Instead of being impossible to realize, as the Futility Thesis claims, electronic self-publishing appears to be quite
feasible. Instead of being too radical a change, as the Alternatives Thesis
claims, electronic self-publishing seems to be the only one radical enough to
address and solve fundamental problems. For all these reasons, legal scholars should embrace electronic self-publishing with enthusiasm.
III. A WHOLE NEW WORLD
Looking back on the commentaries in this Special Issue of the Akron
Law Review, I am struck by a remarkable omission: several of the commentators fail to consider or even explicitly register the fact that Last Writes? itself
was and is a self-published online document with (even in Version 1.0)
hypertext, multimedia, and other structural features far surpassing the capabilities of the then-existing legal literature. It is as if a number of scholars in
the fifteenth century had picked up a codex and failed to comment on the fact
that it was not a scribally-produced manuscript, but a commercially-printed
book. The explanation for this lack of reaction may have something to do with
how some of the skeptics probably experienced and ultimately analyzed the
document - not an online product, but as a printout.195 Given that in this
instance, the medium was intended to be much of the message, this tactic may
have pre-emptively (and from the skeptics' perspective, perhaps conveniently) neutralized a good part of the article's argument. Somewhat more
broadly, it also seems to have encouraged an implicit misperception: that
electronic self-publishing is nothing more than a proposal.
It is true that Last Writes? offers a broad proposal for an elaborate
system of self-published legal scholarship, but electronic self-publishing
itself - complete with instant dissemination, multinational and multidisciplinary access, hypertext links to other sites, multimedia, electronic reader
comments, and even searchable indices - is already a fact. Last Writes?
demonstrates that legal scholars can self-publish on the Web today -now and create scholarly products not merely as good as, but in many technical and
editorial respects better than any appearing in printed law reviews, or even in
195. This behavior may say as much about some skeptics' level of Neteracy as about the
current (but continually shrinking) limitations of on-screen reading.
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electronic legal journals. 96 The very existence of Last Writes? combined
with its obvious success in generating heated debate in legal circles long
before it was printed in a traditional format together suggest that many of the
skeptics' protests are already too late. The genie of change is out of the bottle.
In their tardiness, those scholars skeptical of electronic self-publishing
are once again following in the footsteps of the critics of commercial printing. Abbot Trithemius wrote In Praiseof Scribes decades after Gutenberg's

invention, and years after his death. Even more telling is the fact that he finished his work in October 1492, the same month that Christopher Columbus
symbolically and definitively put an end to the Middle Ages and its scribal
culture by his discovery of the New World.
In the late 1990s, legal scholars have discovered a whole New World of
their own in the form of the Internet. The discovery of this New World demands radically new arrangements, new customs and new ideas. While the
skeptics lobby for the preservation of the law review, they seem not to appreciate that even more fundamental structures are at stake. In fifty years, in the
midst of an Internet environment, the "article" which has long been the dominant form of expedited academic discourse will likely have given way to
something more akin to what we might today call a "multimedia seminar." '9 7
In a hundred years, the "university" (or, for that matter, the "law school")
which has for so long sponsored, organized and structured both teaching and
advanced (legal) research may not exist in its present physical form. 9 ' To the
extent that Last Writes? presumes the survival of these entities, its recommendation for the development of an elaborate electronic self-publishing system
is in one sense quite conservative. Far from threatening law's most cherished
scholarly and pedagogical traditions, it provides those traditions with a true
technological way-station: a forward base affording both opportunity and
continuity while legal scholars, themselves just disembarked on the shifting
sands of their New World, scan the jungle looking for a clear path inland.
196. "Two centuries ago there was a huge gap between what a scholar could do and what
publishers provided. A printed paper was far superior in legibility to hand-written copies of
the preprint, and it was cheaper to produce than hiring scribes to make hundreds of copies.
Today the cost advantage of publishers is gone, as it is far cheaper to send out electronic
versions of a paper than to have it printed in a journal. The quality advantage of journals [is
also] rapidly eroding ...." Odlyzko, supra note 47, at 82.
197. See generally Jean-Claude Guedon, The Seninar, the Encyclopedia, and the EcoMuseum as Possible Future Forms of Electronic Publishing, in SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING,
supra note 38, at 71.
198. "Four assumptions lie behind our historical conception of a university: the library, a
community of scholars (formed around library), drawing on each others knowledge in different
disciplines; teachers working with small groups of students and a period of schooling that
helps one to transform from adolescent to adult and grants a credential for entering work ....
Information technology is undermining these assumptions. . . . I suspect we are
underestimating the speed at which the traditional university is approaching disintegration."
Peter J. Denning, The University's Next Challenges, COMM. ACM, May 1996, at 27, 29.

